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Public Enforcement of the Freedom of
Information Act
Jefferey M. Sellers*
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966' (FOIA) has transformed
the process by which Executive agencies release information. 2 Private
groups and individuals have secured disclosure of countless materials
that might otherwise have remained secret: from the Food and Drug
Administration, for example, a list of prescription drugs which the
agency had yet to approve but which remained on the market; 3 from the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, records on fall-
out and other harmful effects from atom bomb testing in the 1950's and
1960's; 4 from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, sensitive documents concerning the trial of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg and the assassination of President Kennedy. 5 Instances
such as these attest to the effectiveness of the Act in promoting the re-
lease of information.
To understand the evolution of FOIA enforcement, it is first necessary
to distinguish the two broad categories into which the institutional
forms of law enforcement have typically been divided. Under models of
private law enforcement, such as those characteristic of tort and con-
tract law, individuals seeking to invoke the coercive sanctions of the
state both initiate and largely control the judicial process. 6 Under sys-
tems of public enforcement, such as those typical of administrative and
criminal law, the state itself, presumably acting on behalf of society in
general, directs or administers the sanctioning process. 7
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The relation between these models of enforcement is complex. Under
either model, the universe of appropriate enforcement mechanisms en-
compasses far more than coercive or punitive responses to violations of
the law. Individuals and institutions charged with enforcement may
also help to secure compliance with the law through noncoercive means
such as instruction in what the law requires, persuasion, or coordination
of efforts to comply. Often, public and private activities complement
rather than substitute for each other in the enforcement of the same
law.8 The proper combination of enforcement mechanisms depends on
a vast array of considerations: the substantive character of the law to be
enforced, the identity of potential violators, the nature of the tools that
might be applied to promote compliance, and the political or adminis-
trative postures of the individuals and institutions which might be relied
upon to implement those tools.
This note considers public enforcement activities in a particular ad-
ministrative context. The enforcement history of FOIA illustrates the
broad range of enforcement techniques available to governmental bod-
ies seeking to ensure compliance with a law. While the text of the origi-
nal act provided for enforcement only through private suits in court,9 a
wealth of public enforcement activities, some initiated by Congress and
some by Executive officials themselves, have also evolved to foster com-
pliance. These nonjudicial enforcement actions illustrate the way in
which coercive sanctions are applied within a governmental bureau-
cracy, and the variety of non-coercive devices available to promote com-
literature have adopted a number of different approaches to this broad distinction. Chayes
has emphasized that judicial adjudication may tend toward a public or private model. Id. He
distinguishes the public from private because the former is prospective rather than retrospec-
tive, multi-party rather than bilateral, negotiative rather than imposed, ad hoc rather than
liability-based, concerned with public policy issues rather than confined to a single dispute
over private rights, and entails an active rather than a passive judicial role. Id at 1302.
Mashaw relies on a similar distinction to delineate the differences between various types of
enforcement mechanisms under a regulatory statute. Mashaw, Rights in the Federal Administra-
tive State (Dec. 1982) (forthcoming 92 YALE L.J.). Stewart and Sunstein explain the ratio-
nales for such remedies for deficient administrative performance as rights to contest
regulatory action, hearing rights concerned with governmental benefits, implied rights of ac-
tion for private individuals, and private rights to order administrative enforcement action in
terms of three often conflicting conceptions that underly statutes: preservation of entitle-
ments, promotion of efficiency, and advancement of public values. Stewart and Sunstein,
Aiblic Programs andPrioate Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195 (1982). Several writers in the eco-
nomics of law tradition have also compared abstract models of public and private enforce-
ment. See, e.g., Becker and Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEG. STUDIES 1 (1974); Landes and Posner, The Pri'ate Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEG. STUD-
IES 1 (1975); Polinsky, Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEG. STUDIES 105 (1980).
8. For instance, public enforcement systems often incorporate opportunities for private
parties either to sue for commencement of a public enforcement action or to enforce a law
directly through the judicial process. See generally Stewart and Sunstein, supra note 7;
Mashaw, supra note 7.
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
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pliance with such a bureaucracy. The experience of public enforcement
under FOIA also testifies to the way in which enforcement activities
evolve in a bureaucracy over time, and ultimately, to the role political
variables may play in determining the forms of public enforcement.
This Note will examine Congressional and Executive efforts to promote
compliance with FOIA and the indirect effect that these public enforce-
ment activities may have had on actions by private parties to enforce
rights under the Act. A necessary preliminary to any description of how
these activities evolved, however, is an account of the Act itself and the
original private enforcement mechanism.
I. The Freedom of Information Act as a Privately Enforced Statute
Signed into law on July 4, 1966, FOIA replaced the provisions for
government disclosure of information enacted in the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).' 0 The original APA, the first statute to
provide for public disclosure of records, orders, and other Executive doc-
uments, required only that "matters of official record shall in accord-
ance with published rule be made available to persons properly and
directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause
found." It allowed broad exemptions from this requirement for docu-
ments related to "any function of the United States requiring secrecy in
the public interest" and "any matter relating solely to the internal man-
agement of an agency."'" These exceptions in the statutory language,
described by later commentators as "restrictive and nebulously
drafted,"' 2 had allowed agencies to withold records largely at will.
13
The 1966 Act went much further. 14 It directed that agencies in the
Executive Branch make all of their records available for disclosure ex-
cept those for which the Act allowed narrow and specific exemptions.
The nine categories of exempt information were defined more specifi-
cally than in the previous statute. They encompassed (1) information
classified under criteria established by Executive Order, (2) materials
related solely to an agency's internal rules and practices, (3) information
10. Administrative Procedure Act, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946), codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (1964).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
12. United States Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the
Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Infor-
mation of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 4, at 1367 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 House Hearings].
13. Id See also infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 98, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6267, 6267; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPER-
ATIONS, 92dCong., 2dSess., ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT, H.R.
REP. No. 1419, (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 HOUSE REPORT].
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specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, (4) trade secrets and
confidential commercial or financial information, (5) agency memo-
randa that would not be available to the public by law, (6) files whose
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy,
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes, (8) certain
materials related to regulation or supervision of financial institutions,
and (9) geological and geophysical information. 15
In addition to strengthening the statutory presumption favoring dis-
closure, the new Act for the first time added a provision for enforcement
of the public disclosure section of the APA. The original APA had
vested responsibility for review of administrative activity generally in
the courts of appeals.' 6 The new provision, however, effectively elimi-
nated the deference courts of appeals had demonstrated in reviewing
actions under the former section on disclosure. 17 FOIA explicitly
granted district courts "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withold-
ing agency records and to order the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant.""' The burden of proof in
such actions fell on the agency that sought to justify witholding the in-
formation, and courts would interpret the Act so as to authorize judges
to examine the materials in order to evaluate the agency's claim. 19
"Any person," regardless of their interest in obtaining the information,
could request and sue for information under the Act.20 The Act also
directed district courts to assign suits filed under it "precedence . . .
over all other causes" as a general policy, and to expedite FOIA suits "in
every way.''21 Amendments to the Act in 1974 further sought to facili-
tate private actions by requiring indexes of agency documents, imposing
time limits for administrative responses to requests for information and
administrative appeals, explicitly authorizing in camera inspection by
courts of requested documents, shortening the time permitted for agen-
cies to answer complaints in court, allowing award of attorney's fees to
successful plaintiffs, and explicitly making available any "reasonably
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
16. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 10, 60 Stat. 237, 243-44 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 1009 (1964)).
17. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Compagna et al., 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949) (APA, including
§ 1009, held inapplicable to United States Parole Board); Nola Electric v. Reilly, 11 F.R.D.
103, 105 (D.C.N.Y. 1950) ("It is within the Executive authority [under 5 U.S.C. § 22, despite
§ 1009] to promulgate rules severely limiting disclosure of Government files."). See the ac-
count in H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 223-28 (1953).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
19. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 88 (1973).
20. Id at 79.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (1982).
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segregable" portion of records requested in court. 22
Even during the detailed discussion of FOIA prior to its passage, Con-
gress scarcely considered how the provisions for disclosure would actu-
ally be administered. 23 Legislative debate instead focused on the
broader issues of principle surrounding access to government informa-
tion.24 The failure to consider how the bureaucracy might administer
the Act resulted in large measure from the intense opposition the Act
inspired among all of the principal Executive agencies. While these
agencies uniformly claimed that the Act was unconstitutional and an
unmanageable administrative burden, they never offered to discuss
what administrative mechanisms might be necessary to coordinate a
positive effort to comply.2 5 The only thorough discussion of the Act fo-
cused on the wording of specific exemptions.2 6 Cryptic treatment of the
Act, however, may have been necessary to secure passage of the bill in
the face of a hostile executive branch. 27
Creation of a private judicial remedy without assignment of an
agency or agencies to assist in administration, however, was an unusual
arrangement for a Federal administrative statute.28 Those in favor of
this provision argued that the ultimate decision as to whether disclosure
should take place should be removed from the Executive Branch to a
forum more likely to take the presumption in favor of disclosure seri-
ously. 29 While the courts of appeals had shown substantial deference to
agency action in appellate review of agency decisions under the APA,
22. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)). The
attitude of courts also shifted substantially in favor of disclosure under the new Act. See thita
note 34, and notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
23. See Administrative Procedure Act: learings Before the Subcomm. on Admiutrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [Hereinafter cited as
1965 Senate Hearings ]; Federal Public Records Law Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Opera-
tions and Government Information of the House of Representatives Comm. on Government Operations, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1966) [Hereinafter cited as 1966 House leangs]; H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE AND CONG. NEWS 1418.
24. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearngs at 130 (Testimony of Eugene Patterson, Editor, Atlanta
Constitution) ("Surely it is time to open the doors of Government except for those properly
closed .. "); at 4 (Statement of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.) ("Everything in our common law
heritage and the history of our Constitution" demands recognition of "a 'right to know,'
endorsed by Congress .... ").
25. See, e.g., id at 192-97 (Statement of Asst. Attorney Gen. Norbert Schlei); at 29-33
(Statement of Edwin Rains, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Treasury).
26. See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (Statement of Edwin Rains, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Treas-
ury); at 178 (Statement of Prof. Kenneth Davis).
27. Archibald, The Freedom of Information Act Revisited, 39 PuB. AD. REV. 311, 313 (1979).
28. Most substantive administrative statutes, of course, delegated to an agency responsi-
bility either for administering sanctions or for bringing enforcement actions in the courts.
The APA authorized judicial review of agency action as an enforcement mechanism, but only
at the appellate level. See supra note 16.




allowing private actions that entailed what amounted to a de novo review
of the facts in district court with the burden of proof on the relevant
agency, was likely to provide relatively strict judicial enforcement of dis-
closure requirements. The notion that this exclusively judicial enforce-
ment scheme might have shortcomings that would also necessitate some
administrative role in enforcement never received serious discussion. 30
Creation of a private judicial sanction, however, was bound to have far-
reaching consequences for internal agency procedures concerned with
dissemination and withholding of information.
Government-wide rules regarding agency conduct, of course, were far
from new; the APA itself was perhaps the most far-reaching example.
But the hearings prior to passage of FOIA demonstrated the well-estab-
lished tendency of agencies to circumvent the intent behind the APA
provisions by interpreting the law in a way that favored the withholding
of information. 3 1 Judicial review by the courts of appeal had clearly
failed to reverse this tendency. 32 The bias toward withholding resulted
from an amalgamation of many factors: "bureaucratic notions of offi-
cial secrecy, years of ingrained habits of self-protection, exaggerated
fears of public disclosure," and opposition to the Act itself.33 These con-
30. The absence of discussion of this issue in the initial legislative debates might also have
reflected congressional confidence that its own oversight activities could address any adminis-
trative problems effectively. During consideration of the 1974 amendments a House subcom-
mittee did consider a bill that would establish a seven-member "Freedom of Information
Commission" with oversight responsibility and a quasi-appellate function. See The Freedom of
Information Act." Hearings on HR 5425 and HR. 4960 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and
Gov't Information of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-20, 29 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 House Hearings]. This proposal, however, met with opposition in
initial hearings on the proposed amendments. See, e.g., id at 281 (Statement of Antonin
Scalia, Chairman, Admin. Conf. of the U.S.) (Commission "seems to introduce another layer
of administration into a system which is already somewhat complex."); at 320 (Statement of
John T. Miller, Chairman, Section on Administrative Law, Am. Bar Ass'n) ("[T]he more
experience one has with Federal commissions and agencies, the less one is inclined to be opti-
mistic about their inexpensive character or their speed."). Consequently, sponsors of the bill
decided not to include the provision for a commission in the bill as reported, confining the
amendments largely to technical changes. See SUBCOMM. ON GOV'T INFORMATION AND IN-
DIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST
SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502),
SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, 245-46 (Jt.
Comm. Print 1975) (explanation of bill on House floor) [hereinafter cited asJoint Source Book].
31. See, e.g. ,Availability of Information qfom Federal Dep'ts and Agencies: Hearing Before the Gov't
Information Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Part 17, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959);
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 23; 1966 House Hearings, supra note 23.
32. See supra note 17.
33. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURE OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 53 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as 1980 SENATE REPORT]. It remains unclear how much of the motivation to withhold
resulted from rational self-interest and how much from simple habit.
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ditions highlighted the need to reinforce the countervailing interest in
disclosure, which Congress had already affirmed in the strict substantive
language of FOIA, through the addition of an effective enforcement
mechanism.
The remedy that Congress chose for this purpose was a private right
of action. The judicial injunction that the Act authorizes carries with it
the threat of severe penalties, imposed by the court pursuant to a private
suit, should the agency continue its refusal to disclose the material at
issue.3 4 Judicial enforcement appears to have been effective in encour-
aging disclosure of information. In the first four years FOIA was in ef-
fect, petitioners secured release of all or part of the documents they
sought in seventy percent of the cases decided in court.3 5
As a private right of action, however, this enforcement mechanism
relies on those deprived under the Act to sue to vindicate their rights.
The injured class created by a substantive violation of FOIA consists
only of those with the individual motivation to make an initial request
for information under the statute, regardless of whether their motivation
is idealistic or derived from self-interested concerns. By explicitly plac-
ing the sole responsibility for pursuing sanctions on these private citi-
zens, the drafters of the Act sought to avoid the difficulties inherent in
relying on collective private action for enforcement. 36 Under FOIA,
whatever motivation prompted the original request must remain suffi-
cient, despite such constraints as time and cost, to stimulate an appeal to
the courts if the agency refuses to disclose the requested information.
Provisions to make judicial action cheaper, quicker, and more assuredly
favorable to the FOIA applicant encourage assertion of this private
right of action.
II. Direct Pubhc Enforcement Under FOA
A full explanation of enforcement under the Act must also take into
account the many public activities intended to foster maximum compli-
ance. The government actors that undertook these activities belonged
34. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(G) (1982) ("In the event of noncompliance with the order of
the court, the district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and in the
case of a uniformed service, the responsible member.").
35. See 1972 House Hearings, supra note 12, Part 4, at 1339.
36. These difficulties reside in the fact that the benefit to each member of the public from
release of information may not be enough to motivate a rational individual to act on behalf of
the public. This situation can lead to a failure to secure release of information when disclo-
sure might effect a net benefit to society. Seegenerally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1970) (describing other examples of this "free rider" problem, in which an individ-
ual's incentive to act in own narrow self-interest is less than incentive to act on behalf of a
group in a way that ultimately would benefit the individual more).
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to both the legislative and executive branches. Perhaps the most promi-
nent, and the closest to a "lead agency" in administering the Act, has
been the Department of Justice. The Department has used its authority
to withhold counsel from agencies defending against suits under the Act
as a tool to promote compliance. 37 It has issued interpretations of the
Act, offered individualized advice on substantive interpretation, coordi-
nated enforcement efforts undertaken by agencies themselves, and as-
sisted in training employees throughout the Executive Branch to apply
FOIA properly. 38 A provision in the 1974 amendments requiring the
Department to report annually to Congress regarding activities by the
Department intended to further compliance with the Act in other agen-
cies supplied a limited statutory basis for this prominent status in en-
forcement of the Act.39 The attitudes of different administrations
toward the Act have exerted perhaps their greatest effect on enforce-
ment efforts at this level, as successive administrations have adjusted the
Justice Department enforcement apparatus to accord with their view of
FOIA.40 As this note will show, however, the impetus behind the promi-
nent role assumed by the Department has in large measure followed
from internal pressures generated by its unique position in the structure
of public enforcement.
Congressional committees, a second group of actors with a crucial role
in administering the Act, have assumed their function for two apparent
reasons. As we shall see, Congress has never authorized, and the Justice
Department has seldom assumed, a strong lead agency role in coordinat-
ing and promoting compliance with the Act. However, the democratic
values that motivated the Act have proven attractive issues for Congres-
sional politicians in search of political capital. 4' As a result, Congress
has exercised more intensive oversight and guidance under FOIA than
under many other statutes: during the 1970's an average of 14 days of
hearings a year concerned issues related to the Act. 42 Staff of the princi-
37. See infra notes 66-105 and accompanying text.
38. See infa notes 153-56, 160-62, 212 and accompanying text.
39. "The Attorney General shall submit an annual report ... which shall include for the
prior calendar year a listing of the number of cases arising under this section, the exemption
involved in each case, the disposition of such case, and the cost, fees and penalties assessed
• .. such report shall also include a description of the efforts undertaken by the Department
of Justice to encourage agency compliance with this section." 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1982).
40. See inkfa notes 66-105 and accompanying text.
41. "[T]he freedom of information policy prospect provides an occasion when a legislator
can assume the all-too-often illusive role of a statesman pursuing good government proce-
dures in the "public interest." Relyea, Faithful Execution of the FOIA Act. 4 Legislative Branch
Perspective, 39 PUB. AD. REv. 328 (1979).
42. Data compiled from abstracts of hearings published annually by Congressional Infor-
mation Service, 1970-80. Of course, this data does not indicate the amount of time devoted to
actual oversight of implementation, as opposed to any need for substantive legislative change,
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pal oversight subcommittees in the House and Senate 43 have also gath-
ered general information on enforcement of the Act throughout the
government and have sometimes dealt with individual complaints con-
cerning the availability of agency records.
A third major role belongs to the administrative agencies. Each has
established its own FOI Office to process internal appeals of denials and
to manage implementation of the Act at the lower levels of the bureau-
cracy. The institutionalization and increasing sophistication of these of-
fices have tended to compensate for the absence of a strong lead agency,
and for the vagaries of enforcement efforts by the Justice Department.
The Civil Service Commission and its successors, the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board and Special Counsel, have been responsible for imple-
menting the disciplinary sanction that the 1974 amendments added for
employees that violate the Act. 4 4 The civil service authority, the Office
of Personnel Management, the General Services Administration, and an
organization of information professionals within the bureaucracy 45 have
conducted government-wide training sessions on the Act. Finally, such
entities as the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Re-
search Service (CRS) and the Administrative Conference of the United
States have contributed research and expertise that have aided the prin-
cipal enforcers.
The forms of public enforcement undertaken by these actors varied
tremendously. On the whole, however, it is fair to say that a flexible,
largely noncoercive form of sanctioning has evolved into the primary
form of public penalty imposed to enforce the Act. Giving advice, pub-
lishing interpretations, managing a growing information bureaucracy,
and educating agency employees about the requirements of the Act
comprise important elements of FOIA enforcement efforts throughout
the bureaucracy. Policy differences over how the Act should be admin-
istered have surfaced recurrently, most notably at the level of Justice
Department coercive and interpretative activities. Yet over time, coer-
cion, administration, interpretative guidance and training have largely
become institutionalized in individual agencies as well as in the Justice
or the number of staff hours devoted to less formal oversight. Such an estimate thus provides
only a rough guide to congressional interest in the Act. See also Relyea, supra note 41, at 329
(citing "formal record of dedicated oversight efforts").
43. In the House, the Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and
Government Operations (after 1974 the Subcommittee on Government Information and In-
dividual Rights, and after 1983 the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and
Agriculture), and in the Senate the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure (after 1981 the Subcommittee on the Constitution) have assumed this primary
oversight role.
44. See inra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
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Department and Congress. The remainder of this section will describe
this evolution.
A. The Dzsczph'nar2 Sanction
The most unambiguously coercive public enforcement tool under the
Act has been the disciplinary sanction that the 1974 amendments au-
thorized for employees responsible for violations. This provision,
praised initially as "potentially the most important" of the amend-
ments,4 6 gave a public agency the ultimate authority to impose unspeci-
fied penalties on individual violators of the Act in the same manner a
court might impose a fine for contempt. 47 By 1980, however, a Senate
Committee Report found that "weakness in [the] statutory language,
inadequate administrative procedures to implement [the provision], and
a questionable judicial interpretation have combined to limit [its] effec-
tiveness. ' '48 The history of the disciplinary provision raises questions as
to the practicability of such a blatantly coercive, relatively inflexible
sanction as a tool for enforcement.
The disciplinary sanction originated as a legislative proposal for a
purely private remedy, that is, a remedy imposed by a court under a
private right of action. Ralph Nader and others testifying at Congres-
sional hearings had proposed that criminal sanctions be authorized as
"incentives" to overcome the tendency of bureaucrats to withhold infor-
mation.49 In response, the Senate bill contained a provision that would
have authorized courts to order suspension without pay of up to 60 days
or "other appropriate disciplinary or corrective action" for employees
responsible for withholding information "without reasonable basis in
46. Vaughn, The Sanctions Provision of the Freedom of Information Act Amendments, 25 AM. U.L.
REV. 7 (1975).
47. "Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records improperly with-
held from the complainant and assesses against the United States reasonable attorney's fees
and other litigation costs, and the court additionally issues a written finding that the circum-
stances surrounding the withholding raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrar-
ily or capriciously with respect to the withholding, the Civil Service Commission shall
promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against
the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the withholding. The Commission,
after investigation and consideration of the evidence submitted, shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the administrative authority of the agency concerned and shall send
copies of the findings and recommendations to the officer or employee or his representative.
The administrative authority shall take the corrective action that the Commission recom-
mends." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1982).
48. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 103.
49. Executive Privilege, Secreg in Government, Freedom of Information: Hearngs on S 858, S Con.
Res. 30, SJ Res. 72, S. 1106, S. 1112, S 1520, S 1923, and S 2073 Before the Subcomm. on Govt
Operations and the Subcomms. on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Vol. 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Senate Hearings].
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law."' 50 The House of Representatives included no such provision in its
version of the bill. House conferees objected to the sanction as an "unu-
sual" grant of power over Federal agencies to the judiciary and as a
danger to the rights of Federal employees. 5 ' Consequently, the legisla-
tion that emerged from the Conference and was ultimately enacted pre-
served judicial authority to initiate the sanctioning process, but shifted
the final decision on whether or not to apply the sanction from the
courts to the bureaucracy. Courts were to refer their findings concern-
ing the behavior of agency officials to the Civil Service Commission for a
"proceeding" undertaken to formulate a "recommendation" on whether
sanctions should be applied and what form they should take. The Com-
mission would submit its recommendation to the "administrative au-
thority" of the relevant agency, which would then undertake "the
corrective action the Commission recommend[ed]. ' 52 The conference
committee report prescribed that the Civil Service proceeding would en-
tail all the rights usually observed in Civil Service actions, including a
right to appeal within the Commission. 53
The addition of procedural hurdles to application of the disciplinary
sanction was certain to weaken its coercive effect. Nonetheless, even
such a feeble statutory provision, if implemented aggressively by the in-
stitutions charged with enforcement, might still have retained some ef-
fectiveness. By the late 1970's, however, the courts and the Civil Service
Commission had come to apply the disciplinary sanction in a way that
only confirmed its insignificance in the scheme of enforcement. In Holy
v. Acree, 54 the first case referred by a court to the Commission, the Cus-
toms Service had simply ignored both an initial FOIA request and an
application for appeal from the denial of the request. The District
Court, following the terms of the statute, referred the judicial findings to
the Civil Service General Counsel, who was responsible under Civil
50. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., AMENDING THE FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION ACT, S. Rep. No. 854, at 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 SENATE
REPORT). The report on the Senate bill noted that, despite numerous sanctions for unauthor-
ized disclosure of information, no specific sanction against unauthorized withholding existed.
Moreover, while certain general administrative sanctions were available against employees
who violated classification requirements, none of the 2500 cases under those provisions had
led to punishment for overclassification. For a brief account of the legislative history see
Vaughn, supra note 46, at 8-12.
51. 120 CONG. REc. 34,166 (Oct. 7, 1974) (Statement of Rep. Erlenborn); Vaughn, supra
note 46, at 11.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1982).
53. 120 CONG. REC. 34,161-62 (statement of Rep. Morehead). Moreover, the judicial
finding necessary to initiate the process changed from "conduct with no reasonable basis in
law" to "questions whether the Federal agency personnel acted arbitrarily and capriciously,"
a more lenient phrase that invoked the standard for judicial review of other forms of adminis-
trative action under the APA.
54. 72 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1976).
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Service regulations for conducting the disciplinary proceeding. The
Commission's handling of this investigation, however, suggested hostil-
ity toward the very idea of imposing a sanction. While the General
Counsel did conduct some manner of investigation, he refused at first to
release the results. Only after the plaintiff filed another FOIA request
did the General Counsel send him a letter explaining that the Commis-
sion had decided to take no further action.5 5 In this letter the General
Counsel relied on a strained reading of the Act to avoid what seemed an
inevitable finding of arbitrary and capricious behavior by Customs
Service officials. Since several agency employees had shared responsibil-
ity for ignoring the application, the General Counsel found that none of
them was "primarily responsible" as the statute required. As further
extenuating circumstances, the General Counsel pointed to the adjust-
ments to legal changes and the higher influx of applications that had
followed enactment of the 1974 FOIA amendments and the Privacy Act
of 1974. Thus, a refusal even to respond to repeated FOIA requests-
perhaps the most blatant violation possible under the Act-went un-
punished under the sanctions provision.
Only once since Holy v. Acree has a court referred findings to the civil
service authority,56 and in that instance the Special Counsel closed the
case without issuing public findings.5 7 Other cases interpreting the dis-
ciplinary sanction provision show a trend toward increasingly restrictive
reading of the statutory language. 58 Congress, in the Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978, 59 attempted to bypass judicial reluctance to invoke
the sanctions provision. The new civil service law specifically author-
ized the Special Counsel of the new Merit Systems Protections Board,
which, together with the Office of Personnel Management, supplanted
the Civil Service Commission, to undertake investigations of FOIA vio-
55. See letter from Carl F. Goodman to John C. Sims (Jan. 3, 1977),printed in Freedom of
Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the United
States Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 95th Cong., First Sess. 889-90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
1977 Senate Hearings]; 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 107.
56. See Long v. Internal Revenue Service, Order No. C7-640V (D.C. Wash. 1981).
57. Telephone interview with H. Alma Hepner, Director of Congressional and Public
Relations, Office of Special Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board (March 6, 1984).
58. In Emery v. Laise, 421 F. Supp. 91 (D.D.C. 1976). Decided before the Commission
ruling in Holly, the court held that withholding cannot be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency releases the information following commencement of an FOI action in court. This
precedent allows the most flagrant abuses to take place without even a chance of referral to
the civil service authority, so long as the agency relents when an injunction becomes inevita-
ble. In Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1980). The court narrowed its interpre-
tation of "arbitrary and capricious" behavior in this context to conduct that shows "malice or
bad faith".
59. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209 (1982)).
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lations even in the absence of a judicial referral.6°
While this legislation removes a substantial procedural hurdle to the
imposition of sanctions, it has made no noticeable difference in enforce-
ment of the provision. Despite detailed recommendations in the 1980
Senate Report concerning implementation of the new provisions by the
Counsel and the Board,61 and a number of private petitions to the Spe-
cial Counsel for investigations, the office has yet to issue formal investi-
gative findings on any case under the new statutory arrangement. 62
Under the Reagan Administration even the congressional oversight
committees have refrained from placing pressure on the civil service au-
thority to invigorate the provision. 63 The disciplinary sanction may well
retain some usefulness as a "threat to use against recusant officers," as
some information officials have testified. 64  But this limited coercive
power is likely to be ignored if the potential violator is all but certain
that the sanction will never be imposed. The longer the period of time
without so much as an investigation that might lead to imposition of a
sanction, the more this coercive provision becomes irrelevant to enforce-
ment of the Act.65
B. The Authority of thejustice Department to Refuse Counsel
A second potential coercive tool was inherent in the administrative
structure of the Act. Since all but a handful of agencies lack authority
to defend suits under FOIA in court,6 6 the Justice Department could
60. The statute authorizes the Special Counsel to investigate any allegation concerning
"arbitrary or capricious withholding of information prohibited under § 552 of this title, ex-
cept that the Special Counsel shall make no investigation under the subsection of any with-
holding of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information the disclosure of which is
specifically prohibited by law or by Executive order." 5 U.S.C. § 1206(e)(1)(C) (1982). Ac-
cording to the conference report on the legislation, the authorization to investigate "any alle-
gation" obviates the need for a judicial determination before the Special Counsel can
investigate a FOI Act violation: ". . . this provision is not intended to require that an admin-
istrative or court decision be rendered concerning withholding of information before the spe-
cial counsel may investigate allegations of such a prohibited practice. H.R. Rep. No. 1717,
95th Cong., 2d Sess, at 136 (1978).
61. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 105-08.
62. Telephone interview with H. Alma Hepner, supra note 57.
63. Telephone interview with Robert Gellman, Counsel to House of Representatives
Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agricul-
ture (February 27, 1984). The Public Citizen Litigation Group, however, has filed a suit
requesting judicial referral to the Merit System Protection Board in a case in which OSHA
officials allegedly falsified the contents of a document released under the Act. See Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
Simon v. Dep't of Labor, Civil Action No. 83-3780 (filed Feb. 7, 1984).
64. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 105; telephone interview with Russell Rob-
erts, Chief FOI Officer, Department of Health and Human Services (February 28, 1984).
65. Telephone interview with Robert Gellman, supra note 63; telephone interview with
Eric Glitzenstein, attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group (February 27, 1984).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
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utilize its authority as counsel to the government in such suits to deny
any legal defense in court to an agency threatened with a pending suit.
If the Department refused to deny an agency, and the agency could not
legally defend itself, a judgement against the agency in court would be
inevitable. While this mechanism was available for the Justice Depart-
ment to affect compliance with any administrative statute that assigned
the Department exclusive authority as counsel, the government-wide
application of FOIA made the Department's role particularly impor-
tant: if a weak case led to an unfavorable precedent, the effects would
be felt not only by the agency in which the case arose but by all
agencies. 67
The Department had two principal administrative devices available
to implement this sanction: it could place pressure on an agency di-
rectly, during negotiations to develop a litigation strategy in response to
a suit, or it could provide for clearance of denials before the agency
made a final decision on whether to withhold information. Implemen-
tation remained contingent on the Department's role as a highly public,
politically responsive arm of successive Administrations with different
attitudes toward enforcement of the Act. At the same time, the mecha-
nism initially designed to administer the sanction through clearance of
final agency denials assumed an increasingly consultative, coordinative
role in enforcement before the Reagan Administration dismantled that
mechanism altogether.
In 1969, recently installed Justice Department officials, proclaiming
dissatisfaction with the number of unnecessary FOIA suits that had ac-
cumulated and the loss of several recent FOIA suits in court, established
a "Freedom of Information Committee" to screen final denials by agen-
cies of FOIA applications. The Committee was composed of two mem-
bers of the Department's Civil Division, which was responsible for
litigation, and three officials from its Office of Legal Counsel, which
helped advise the agencies on legal matters. A memorandum announc-
ing formation of the Committee to general counsels of all departments
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General."). A limited number of statutes authorize individual agen-
cies to represent themselves in court under certain circumstances. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. Sect. 77t
(1982) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(b) (1976) (Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission). For a comprehensive, if dated listing which includes
fifteen such statutes, see Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court. Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judziiaqy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
145-46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Court Representation Hearings].
67. Telephone interview with Daniel Metcalf, Co-Director, Office of Information and Pri-
vacy, Dep't of Justice (February 27, 1984); telephone interview with Barbara Babcock, former
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Dep't of Justice (Feb. 28, 1984).
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and agencies "requested" that they consult the Committee before issu-
ing a final denial of an appealed application "if there is any substantial
possibility that such denial might lead to a court decision adversely af-
fecting the government." The FOI Committee would give the proposed
denial "a timely and careful review, in terms of litigaton risks, govern-
mentwide implications and the policy of the Act, as well as the agency's
own interests." 68 This language, and the presence of litigators on the
Committee, implied that the Committee's nominally consultative role
might give way to a coercive, quasi-appellate role. Certainly the possi-
bility that the Department would refuse to defend a denial lurked be-
hind any strong recommendation that material be disclosed.
The formation of the FOI Committee thus appears to have served
several functions. By warning agencies at an early stage that they might
not be defended in court for withholding, the Committee clearance pro-
cess could prevent some weak cases from coming before the Justice De-
partment litigators at all. Enumeration of the considerations the
Committee would take into account in evaluating potential denials
might provide further warning to the agencies. Finally, the public an-
nouncement that the FOI Committee had been established operated as
a signal to the public and Congress as well as to the agencies that the
Nixon administration was serious about enforcing FOIA. In this way,
establishment of the Committee represented an attempt to appeal politi-
cally to those who supported enforcement of the Act, and apparently
reflected a commitment to enforcement on the part of Administration
officials.
The rate of initial contacts between the agencies and the Committee
climbed throughout the early 1970's. Justice officials testifying before
Congress in 1972 estimated the total number of contacts since formation
of the Committee at 400 to 500.69 Not all of these contacts raised sub-
stantial issues, and Committee members and staff disposed of around
half of those that did occasion such issues over the telephone. 70 The
most problematic issues led to "Committee consultations," estimated in
1972 to be taking place at an accelerating rate of 75 to 100 a year. 7'
The vast majority of these consultations were face-to-face meetings be-
tween Committee members and agency personnel that lasted from half
68. Memorandum to General Counsels of All Federal Departments and Agencies Re Coordination of
Certain Administrative Matters Under the Freedom of Information Act (Dec. 8, 1969), printed in 1972
House Hearings, supra note 12, Part 4, at 1132.
69. 1972 House Hearings, supra note 12, Part 4, at 1179-80.
70. See Saloschin, The Work of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Department ofJustice,
23 AD. L. REV. 147, 149 (1971).
71. 1972 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 1179.
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an hour to two hours and treated all the legal and political aspects of the
proposed denial. At the conclusion of the meeting or shortly thereafter,
the Committee would give the agency a recommendation, which might
take one of several forms. Of the 120 consultations that occurred by
1972, for example, about 40 drew a reaction that the material was
"clearly or very probably exempt" from disclosure under the Act. In
another 40 instances the Committee's reaction had been uncertain or
had pointed to an alternative solution besides simple disclosure or non-
disclosure. In 15 of the remaining cases the Committee concluded that
certain of the records were exempt and certain were not. The final 25
cases prompted the Committee to conclude that "the records in dispute
must be released or that the case for withholding. . . was very weak."'72
The effect of this advice, and consequently the effectiveness of the
Committee in promoting compliance, remains undocumented. Only
very rarely did the Civil Division invoke the implicit sanction that un-
derlay the Committee's authority. 73 Coercion instead appears to have
taken the more diluted form of an intimation that the Civil Division
would consider refusing to defend if suit was brought, or simply the tacit
threat of such a refusal. According to FOI Committee Chairman Rob-
ert Saloschin, the agencies followed strong Committee recommendations
to disclose in the vast majority of cases. 74 A 1972 House oversight report
noted an absence of firm evidence about how effective the Committee
was in compelling compliance, but praised the Committee's efforts to
"encourage greater understanding of the act and to help bring about a
more enlightened administration of the act within the Federal bureau-
cracy. ' '75 When Attorney General Elliot Richardson announced in July,
1973 that the Department would refuse to defend agency decisions to
withhold information unless the agency had consulted with the FOI
72. Id at 1182.
73. See G. Lardner, Information Act: Years of Foot-dragging Not Ended, Washington Post, July
26, 1976, reprinted in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, Vol. 2, at 974 ("Justice Department
lawyers told officials at Agriculture to make the information public or take the risk of going to
court without a lawyer. Agriculture ignored the warning and suit was filed. 'Counsel was
withheld,' the government lawyer said, 'and Agriculture had to give in.' "). Jeff Axelrad, the
attorney in the Civil Division who handled most of these early cases for the Department,
recalls one instance in which Justice attorneys, in handling a case resulting from an instance
of witholding in which the agency had not consulted the Committee, decided to refrain from
opposing a motion for summary judgment by the petitioner. Telephone interview with Jef-
frey Axelrad, former Chief of Information and Privacy Section, Civil Division, Department of
Justice (February 28, 1984).
74. Telephone interview with Robert Saloschin, Former Chairman of FOI Committee,
(April 28, 1983).
75. STAFF OF HOUSE OF GOV'T OPERATIONS COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., ADMINIS-
TRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT: AN EVALUATION OF GOV'T INFORMA-
TION PROGRAMS UNDER THE AcT, 1967-72, at 69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 HOUSE
REPORT].
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Committee prior to a final denial, 76 he appeared to confirm a mildly
coercive role for the Committee.
By the middle to late 1970s, the Committee had assumed a less coer-
cive role in government-wide efforts to promote compliance. The in-
creasing number of applications and appeals that followed passage of
the 1974 amendments, the diversion of Committee officials to such tasks
as issuing government-wide interpretations of the amendments, 77 the in-
creasing institutionalization of expertise in individual agencies adminis-
tering the Act,78 and the relative absence of pressure from the highest
levels of the Ford Administration to stake out a public position in favor
of strict implementation7 9 resulted in a policy of returning as much coer-
cive and consultive activity as practicable to the agencies themselves.8 0
In 1976 Attorney General Edward Levi removed the requirement that
agencies consult the FOI Committee before issuing a denial.,, Commit-
tee review of final agency denials also became more cursory. About this
time, the Committee began to divide its consultations into two types:
"summary" consultations usually handled by the Committee chairman
over the telephone, and "in-depth" consultations that retained the face-
to-face format. The number of in-depth consultations, formerly as high
as 100 annually, shrank to 21 in 1976 and 15 in 1979. Moreover, a third
to a half of these were "preconsultations" that occurred in the early
stages of processing, and served more as a way to aid the agency in for-
mulating an initial opinion in a case than as any sort of appellate con-
trol.8 2 These changes in the FOI Committee virtually guaranteed that
review would assume a less coercive tenor, and perhaps even that it
would play a less significant role in inducing compliance.
76. See 38 Fed. Reg. 19123 (July 18, 1973). See also 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33,
at 145 (quoting from Committee for Public Justice, TheJustice Department and Freedom of Infor-
mation: Is the Bell Directive Enough? JUSTICE DEPARTMENT WATCH, Summer 1977, at 2). The
new policy required only consultation with the Committee, not approval of the decision to
withold information.
77. The Committee and its staff became preoccupied increasingly with such advisory
functions as preparation of guides to interpretation of the Act in light of new developments
and "special problem areas." More time was also necessary to apprise Committee members
of the growing body of case law under the Act. See annual Reports of the Dep't of Justice on
Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, 1977 at 17-18, 1978 at 24 [hereinafter
cited as Justice Dep't Annual Reports].
78. Justice Dep't Annual Reports, supra note 77, 1977 at 18, 1978 at 24.
79. Telephone interview with Barbara Babcock, supra note 67; telephone interview with
Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 73.
80. Interview with Robert Saloschin, supra note 74.
81. See 41 Fed. Reg. 10222 (March 10, 1976) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1977)). To
justify this action, Levi contended that procedural deadlines imposed by the 1974 amend-
ments, along with a heavy influx of requests for information by 1975, had made the former
policy "an impracticable bar" to proper administration of the Act. 41 Fed. Reg. at 10222.




Nonetheless, a memorandum from Attorney General Griffin Bell in
May, 1977 announced to the heads of all Federal departments and
agencies that "the Justice Department will defend Freedom of Informa-
tion Act suits only when disclosure is demonstrably harmful, even if
there is some arguable legal basis for the withholding. '8 3  While the
memorandum incorporated a bias in favor of disclosure, the new "de-
monstrable harm" standard differed only in specificity from the "policy
of the act" which the 1969 memorandum had announced that the FOI
Committee would consider in formulating its recommendation concern-
ing disclosure.8 4 Throughout the Carter Administration, the FOI Com-
mittee retained the same chairman it had always had, Robert Saloschin,
and essentially the same policies. Even if the threat of coercion re-
mained present in the Committee clearance process, the shortage of
Committee staff assigned to review final denials in detail assured that
the threat would have less potential force.
The Civil Division, of course, could still administer the sanction of
refusing counsel directly as a part of its function of developing litigation
strategy. Even here, however, the seriousness with which the Depart-
ment used its authority remains open to question. The Justice Depart-
ment in 1979 issued a detailed set of procedures to govern consideration
of refusals to defend suits under the Act,85 but materials distributed by
the Department at the same time throughout the government empha-
sized that "such action will only be taken in rare situations, and after
consultation between [Justice officials in charge of information policy]
and the litigators. '86 Continuing struggles within the Department be-
tween those in favor of the pro-disclosure policy of the 1977 memoran-
dum and those advocating a more permissive approach to accepting
cases under the Act further hampered effective implementation of the
Department's authority.8 7 In the end, the announcement of the "de-
monstrable harm" standard probably exerted a greater effect as a coor-
dinative policy guide to officials charged with ensuring compliance in
83. Office of the Attorney Gen., Memorandum on FOIA, (May 5, 1977), reprinted In 1977
Senate Heanngs, supra note 55, at 217-18 [hereinafter cited as 1977 Memorandum].
84. The new criteria were: "(a) Whether the agency's denial seems to have a substantial
legal basis, (b) Whether defense of the agency's denial involves an acceptable risk of adverse
impact on other agencies, (c) Whether there is a sufficient prospect of actual harm to legiti-
mate public or private interests if access to the requested records were to be granted to justify
the defense of the suit, and (d) Whether there is sufficient information about the controversy
to support a reasonable judgment that the agency's denial merits defense under the three
preceeding criteria." This amounted to little more than a more specific rearticulation of the
criteria listed supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. See Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1978 at 24.
86. 1 FOIA Update 7 (Autumn 1979).
87. Telephone interview with Barbara Babcock, supra note 67; telephone interview with
Jeffery Axelrad, supra note 73.
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the individual agencies than as a direct influence on the activities of the
FOI Committee or Justice Department litigators.8 8
More important to the role of the Committee under the Carter Ad-
ministration was the formation of a new Office of Information Law and
Policy (OILP) in the Justice Department in October, 1978. The chair-
man of the Committee became director of OILP, and the Committee
itself was reincorporated as an arm of the office with increased responsi-
bility for consultation with the FOI appeals Office that processed the
Department's own FOIA applications and appeals.8 9 For the remainder
of the Carter Administration, OILP staff took on most of the responsibil-
ity for initial advisory contacts between agencies and the Justice Depart-
ment. OILP also stepped up the many coordinative and consultative
activities that the FOI Committee and its staff lacked the resources to
undertake effectively. Yet the activities of the Committee itself re-
mained confined mostly to detailed consultations on a range of issues,
including a vestigal quasi-appellate function. 90
Only in initiating regular review of pending FOIA suits that the De-
partment had previously accepted did the Carter Administration clearly
increase use of the Department's authority to refuse counsel. Through-
out the early 1970's, the Justice Department had never reconsidered a
decision to defend an agency in a suit brought under FOIA. The memo-
randum issued in May, 1977, however, announced a review of all 600
pending cases to determine how many might merit a more compromis-
ing litigative stance or dismissal.9 ' Even here, resistance among Depart-
ment attorneys reluctant to change positions or give up on the cases in
the backlog greatly limited the success of the pro-disclosure policy.92
The review, which extended to approximately 475 of the pending cases,
led to dismissal in four cases and efforts toward settlement or a partial
release of the withheld information in an unspecified number of
others.9 3 A policy of regular FOI Committee consultations on problems
in pending suits followed up the review. Approximately 20 such consul-
tations took place in 1979, and 30 in the first year of the Reagan
88. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, TIMELINESS AND COMPLETENESS OF
F.B.I. AND PRIVACY ACTS HAVE IMPROVED, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP. No. GGD-78-
51, at 46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AGO REPORT No. GGD-78-51]; telephone interview
with Barbara Babcock, supra note 67.
89. Justice Department Annual Report, supra note 77, 1978 at Appendix B.
90. See id.
91. See 1977 Memorandum, supra note 83.
92. Telephone interview with Barbara Babcock, supra note 67; telephone interview with
Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 73.
93. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General William Schaffer to Senator James




The announcement of the "demonstrable harm" standard and the
case review, like the formation of the FOI Committee during the Nixon
Administration, both reflected a position favoring the pro-disclosure
policy of the Act and represented attempts to capitalize on perceived
political sentiment in favor of disclosure. Ultimately, however, Justice
Department enforcement activities under the Carter Administration
pointed to a less coercive, more consultative role for the Department in
admininstration of FOIA. The culmination of these trends came with
the Reagan Administration. In a memorandum to the heads of all de-
partments and agencies in May 1981, Attorney General William French
Smith announced a new policy which greatly lowered the standards the
Department would apply in deciding whether to defend FOIA suits. 9 5
By 1982, Departmental reorganizations under Smith had disbanded the
FOI Committee altogether, and thereby severed the Office of Informa-
tion and Privacy (OIP) (for a time the Office of Legal Counsel), where
consultative activities to enforce the Act remained, from Civil Division
officials in charge of litigation decisions.96 The cumulative effect of
these actions was a signal to agencies that the Department had alto-
gether disavowed use of its power of counsel as a coercive tool.97 Yet
despite these actions, the Reagan Justice Department has maintained
and even enhanced such functions as providing telephone consultations
for agencies, issuing general interpretative statements, and lending sup-
port for training activities. 98
The growing commitment to a purely consultative as opposed to a
coercive approach has stemmed in part from the genuine belief of offi-
cials long involved in Justice Department activities under the Act that
enforcement activities could be handled more effectively at the individ-
94. See Annual Reports of the Justice Department, 1979, 1981, supra note 77.
95. In the memorandum Smith announced: "The Department's current policy is to de-
fend all suits challenging an agency's decision to deny a request submitted under the FOIA
unless it is determined that: (a) The agency's denial lacks a substantial legal basis; or
(b) Defense of the agency's denial presents an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on other
agencies ability to protect important records." Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum
on FOIA (May 4, 1981) (on file with the Yale Law and Pohy Review). This new policy reversed
the presumption against defense of FOIA suits which had characterized earlier Justice De-
partment policy.
96. Informal contacts between the litigators and OIP, however, continue to take place.
See Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1982 at 204 (75 litigation consultations by
OIP in 1982 "at the request of, and in coordination with, the Department of Justice's litigat-
ing divisions.'.
97. See infa note 130 and accompanying text.
98. See zhn/a notes 162, 167, 189, 212, and accompanying text. In at least one instance the
Department refused to defend the legal position taken by an agency. Telephone interview
with Daniel Metcalf, supra note 67.
Yale Law & Policy Review
ual agency level.99 In addition, the reluctance of Justice Department
officials to use their authority as counsel as a sanction can be traced to
intra-departmental loyalties. Beneath the cautious attitude of Justice
Department officials lay a concern that regular refusals to defend agen-
cies would induce Congress to grant agencies the authority to defend
themselves in court. 00 Justice officials noted with concern that agencies
constantly lobbied to obtain authority for their own general counsel to
represent them. 0 1 For the Justice Department, the loss of this exclusive
authority would mean the loss of any coercive power, a fragmentation of
positions among counsel for the government, and a less important func-
tion for the Department itself. 0 2
Moreover, aside from political motivations guiding Departmental
policies, the only driving force behind formation of the Committee and
use of its veiled sanction was the standard of legal representation held by
Justice Department officials: their desire to do legal work of high quali-
ty, and their reluctance to take on cases they were certain to lose.10 3
This motivation thus depended to a great extent on the subjective stan-
dards of those managing the Department at any particular time, and
not on the policies of particular administrations.
As might be expected, political developments such as the changing
attitudes toward the Act under different Administrations played an im-
portant role in the evolution of Justice Department enforcement activi-
ties, and to a less dramatic extent in the development of enforcement
activities throughout the agencies under FOIA. The three major state-
ments by Attorneys General on the role of the Committee and the stan-
dards for denials, for example, constituted initial public statements of
policy toward the Act by the three Administrations elected since its en-
actment, and were certain to influence activities throughout the Execu-
99. Telephone interview with Robert Saloschin, supra note 74; telephone interview with
Daniel Metcalf, supra note 67.
100. Grants of this authority to agencies became increasingly common in the 1970s. See,
e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Sect. 2, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 889 (1972) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 1366 (1976)) (authorizing Environmental Protection Agency to represent self
in court under Act if Attorney General fails to notify Administrator "within a reasonable
time" that Attorney General will represent agency); Federal Trade Commission Act, Sect.
240(a), Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2199 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1982)) (authoriz-
ing Federal Trade Commission lawyers to control litigation in specified types of actions, and
to undertake other types of litigation if Attorney General fails to respond within 45 days of
request for counsel). See generally Court Representation Hearings, supra note 66, at 145-46 (listing
similar statutes up to 1976).
101. See G. Lardner, supra note 71; Court Representation Hearings, supra note 66, at 146-47.
102. Telephone interview with Robert Saloschin, supra note 74; telephone interview with
Barbara Babcock, supra note 67.
103. d. High standards could secure the self-interest of individual Justice officials by en-
hancing their reputation, but this motivation would depend on the individual, and was not
reinforced by any clear institutional motivation on the part of the Department.
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tive Branch. The 1969 and 1977 statements, with their strong hints that
the Department's authority might be used as a sanction, reflected both
an ideological bias in favor of the principles embodied in the Act and an
attempt to appeal politically to those who supported those principles.
The 1981 statement, along with subsequent Justice Department disman-
tling of the Committee, reflected and appealed to a bias against effectu-
ating the Act and its principles. Despite changing administration
politics, however, a cadre of professional civil service lawyers have pro-
vided a degree of continuity in the history of this coercive authority:
they resisted the pro-disclosure policies of the Carter Administration, 10 4
and their presence guarantees that even under the Reagan Administra-
tion the use of this coercive authority will not end completely. 0 5
The two mechanisms the Department used to implement its coercive
authority also displayed substantial advantages over the disciplinary
sanction as enforcement tools. The sanction the Committee or the Civil
Division might threaten, i.e., the withdrawal of counsel in a single in-
stance, was probably less intimidating to agency officials than the per-
sonal censure that the civil service authority would likely use if it
applied its disciplinary sanction. The flexibility available to Justice De-
partment lawyers in either process enabled them to threaten explicitly,
or to combine threats with persuasion or advice, and on appropriate
occasions to substitute consultation completely for coercion. The disci-
plinary provision, with its requirement of formal findings and investiga-
tion, and even, for a time, of a formal judicial initiative, allowed far less
flexibility. Finally, the coercive power of the Justice Department, as ex-
ercised by the Civil Division or the Committee, could be applied in the
context of an ongoing relationship between the Department, as legal
counsel and advisor to the Executive branch, and the agencies them-
selves. At least in the area of information policy, the civil service au-
thority lacked this sort of regular relationship in which to incorporate its
sanctions. The contrast between the flexibility of the Justice Depart-
ment's authority to refuse to defend an agency and the rigidity of the
disciplinary sanction assigned to the civil service authority helps to ex-
plain why the former has been exercised more often, and doubtless with
greater effect, than the latter.
104. Telephone interview with Barbara Babcock, supra note 67; telephone interview with
Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 73.
105. See supra note 98. As of April, 1984, the four senior officials of OIP were career civil
servants appointed during the Carter or Ford Administrations. Telephone interview with
Richard Huff, Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice, (April
9, 1984).
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C. Internal Agency Appeals
Mechanisms within the agencies themselves might also help compel
or otherwise promote compliance with the Act. As the number of infor-
mation requests increased in the 1970's,106 and the coercive role of the
Justice Department diminished, appellate processes within the agencies
took on a growing proportion of the responsibility for both coercive and
consultative enforcement activities. Justice Department officials en-
couraged this assumption of authority, 0 7 as did the increasing numbers
of agency FOI officials and Offices with a personal interest in assuming
appellate responsibility. 0 8
The intra-agency appellate processes differed from FOI Committee
review in several respects. Because the agency decision-makers in the
appeals process were typically the superiors of those who issued the ini-
tial decision, they wielded the power not only to reverse that decision
but to affect agency employees' careers in a way the Justice Department
could not. Intra-agency appeals offices were thus assured of greater
sanctioning leverage than the Justice Department. An internal appel-
late proceeding allowed reconsideration of a decision by officials with
more concentrated experience in using the information under considera-
tion for disclosure, and who were more likely than the FOI Committee
to be involved in the day-to-day administration of the Act within the
agency. Since the burden to appeal an initial denial fell on the private
individual who made the initial information request, the dynamics of
the appeals process resembled the judicial private right of action more
than did the FOI Committee mechanism. Although placing the proce-
dural hurdle of an appeal before an applicant usually entailed lower
costs for the private citizen than a judicial trial, this administrative pro-
cedure, which normally entailed drafting a letter in support of releasing
the information, served to "weed out frivolous requests"' 09 in a way the
FOI Committee could not.
But appeals could also hinder the effective implementation of the Act.
An intra-agency procedure might lack the independence of a review by
an external body such as the FOI Committee or a court. If agency offi-
106. The GAO, projecting from data reported by selected agencies, estimated that total
information requests under the Act rose from 154,000 in 1975 to 156,000 in 1976 and 177,000
in 1977. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT No. LCD-80-8, AN
INFORMED PUBLIC ASSURES THAT FEDERAL AGENCIES WILL BETTER COMPLY WITH FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION/PRIvACY LAWS, at 22 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT
LCD-80-8].
107. Telephone interview with Robert Saloschin, supra note 74.
108. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
109. D. Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposalfor
Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217, 254 (1971).
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cials were reluctant to release information, an appeal might help to de-
lay the final decision on whether to withhold. 0 The appellate process
also gave the agency an opportunity to offer additional justifications,
such as statutory provisions an initial decision failed to cite, to rational-
ize the original denial."'
Statistics collected by the Library of Congress show substantial appel-
late activity during the first years of the Act. Between 1967 and 1971, of
1822 initial refusals to disclose any information and 373 partial refusals,
FOIA applicants appealed 296 or about 13.5 percent.1 12 The number of
appeals per agency remained low, and some agencies, such as the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Atomic Energy Commission, reported
no appeals at all. 1 3 Agencies reaffirmed denials in 66.2 percent of these
cases, granting 12.5 percent of appeals in full and 14.2 percent in part.
What the high level of affirmed denials indicates is not entirely clear. A
portion of these cases may represent instances in which the agency sim-
ply upheld a valid initial decision. Congressional hearings, however, un-
covered numerous situations which might indicate that appeals served
only to delay or rationalize questionable initial decisions. 114
The 1974 amendments to FOIA both encouraged intra-agency appel-
late processes and attempted to curb their abuse. Time limits for agency
processing of requests under the amendments mandated an initial deter-
mination within 10 working days of receipt of an application. 1 5 Since
processing of initial determinations had averaged 33 days before passage
of the amendments," 16 this deadline placed considerable pressure on the
agencies. If the applicant submitted an appeal of the initial denial, the
amendments allowed an agency an additional 20 working days for
processing the appeal. The amendments thus made an appellate process
inevitable "not only because it permit[ted] the correction of errors and
avoidance of unnecessary litigation but also because, under the 1974
amendment, it ma[d]e available an additional 20 days for agency con-
110. The two-step appellate procedures in some agencies in the early years of the Act
were particularly convenient devices for implementing a strategy of delay. Id
111. When an agency neglected to notify requesters initially denied information of the
right to appeal, it might completely avoid reconsideration of the initial decision. 1972 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 75, at 10.
112. See Congressional Research Service, Special Analysis of Operations of the Freedom of nfor-
mation Act, repritedat 118 CONG. REC. 9949-9953 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SpecialAnaysis].
113. Discrepancies between agencies could have resulted from any number of factors:
from the different substance of information requests between agencies to differences in organi-
zational structure to differences in attitude among agency staff. Id. at 9951.
114. See 1972 HousE REPORT, supra note 75, at 20-42.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976).
116. Special Anal.ysi, supra note 112.
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sideration of the request."" 7
These procedural changes, along with a heavy influx of applications
in the middle to late 1970s, produced a higher level of appellate activity
within the agencies. The Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, which processed only 17 appeals between 1967 and 1971, processed
127 in 1977; the Department of Justice, which considered 14 appeals
between 1967 and 1971, heard 1622 in 1977.118 Government-wide, the
total number of appeals climbed to 3,614 in 1975 and 5,190 in 1977." 9
By the mid-1970's the appeals process in most agencies had become
institutionalized in a separate office, with increasing numbers of staff
devoted to their processing.120 Since no systematic study of the many
appellate processes has been done, evidence of how they operated is nec-
essarily anecdotal rather than fully descriptive. Perhaps the most exten-
sive, and most thoroughly documented, evolved at the Department of
Justice.' 2 1 Throughout 1976 and 1977, its appellate office included 25
staff members, 15 of them attorneys. Although a considerable backlog
led to delays in processing appeals, the office exercised somewhat more
independence than had been the rule in the early days of the Act. In
statistics for 1977, the office reported it had denied 44 percent of appeals
and granted 8 percent in full and 17 percent in part. 122 Seventy-two
percent of the denials reversed or partly reversed on appeal were not
formal reversals, but "modifications of initial actions arrived at in the
course of the appeals process, by agreement between the component and
the appeals office."'1 23 These decisions reflected and emphasized a flex-
ible, consultative aspect of the appeals process that was probably typical
among the agencies, and resembled the flexibility of the FOI Committee
itself. Even as the appeals process threatened to apply compulsion, it
allowed for negotiation and persuasion that could instead simply change
the mind of the official making the initial decision. 24
Government-wide statistics for the middle 1970s demonstrated a
117. Department ofJustice, Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom
of Information Act 6 (1975).
118. See Annual Reports Filed Under Freedom of Informaton Act Show Public Interest Up, and So
Are Costs, 4 ACCESS REPORTS 10 (May 2, 1978).
119. GAO REPORT No. LCD-80-8, supra note 106, at 22.
120. See, e.g., Testimony of Quinlan J. Shea, Jr., Director, Office of Privacy and Informa-
tion Appeals, Department of Justice, 1977 Senate Heangs, supra note 55, at 134.
121. See GAO REPORT No. GGD-78-51, supra note 88.
122. See Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77. The remaining 31 percent of cases
included those concerned with failure to abide by statutory time limits or fee waivers, consoli-
dated appeals, those where no records were found, those withdrawn by the requester, and
other similar cases.
123. Id.
124. For accounts of appellate processes in other agencies, see R. Roberts, The Faithful
Execution of the FOI Act: One Executive Branch Experience, 39 PUB. AD. REV. 318 (1979) (describ-
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slight rise in the use of reversal on appeal as an explicit check on initial
decisions to withhold information. In 1976, agencies denied 46 percent
of appeals in full, granted 42 percent in part and 12 percent in full. In
1977, they denied 53.5 percent in full, granted 42 percent in part and
12.5 percent in full. 125 Compilations for the late 197 0's do not exist.
The change of only 15 to 20 percentage points since the early 1970's in
the proportion of denials may reflect continued use of the appeals pro-
cess to subvert legitimate requests for information. But the statutory
time limits on processing of appeals and initial requests had largely
eliminated the worst abuses of the appellate process in the early
1970's.126 The high proportion of appeals denied may also reflect the
success of the full range of enforcement activities in instilling proper atti-
tudes and awareness of the Act at the lower levels of the agencies. The
appeals office at the Department of Justice sought, in the words of its
director, "to get to the point where every appeal action is an affirmance
of the initial action."' 27 In the Department of Justice, efforts to further
this objective included distribution of prior opinions of the appeals office
throughout the Department as advisory opinions, and other activities
described later in this Note. Any resulting liberalization of disclosure
policy at the lower levels of an agency was bound to produce a higher
level of affirmances on appeal.
Nonetheless, suspicions of abuse in the appeals process persisted. The
1980 Senate report criticized the frequent failure of agencies to give rea-
sons for denials of applications before appeal, 28 a policy that effectively
required applicants to apply twice in order to learn the basis for a de-
nial. The danger also persisted that appeals would serve to rationalize
initial decisions rather than to reconsider them. 29 Following signals
sent forth by the Justice Department under the Reagan Administration
in opposition to strict enforcement of the Act, the agencies appear to
have resorted increasingly to such abuses. 30
ing procedures at Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare); At Commerce Department, Decentrali-
zation is Key to FOIA Work, 2 FOIA Update 7 (June 1981).
125. GAO REPORT LCD-80-8, supra note 106, at 22.
126. The 1980 Senate Report noted that "the majority of agencies are complying or mak-
ing a reasonable effort to comply with the administrative response times enacted in 1974."
1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 64.
127. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 136.
128. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 45-46.
129. The Report evidenced concern for this problem in an emphasis on the need to sepa-
rate employees considering initial denials from those hearing appeals. Id. at 62.
130. See Gelbspan, Reagan Changes in Information Act Under Scrutiny, Boston Globe, Jan. 24,
1984, at 1, col. 3 (detailing abuses of process of appeals and initial decisionmaking process).
Public interest attorneys working with the Act have noticed an increase in the intransigence
of agencies with respect to withholding information under the Reagan Administration. Tele-
phone interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 65; telephone interview with Elaine Eng-
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Long before the Reagan Administration encouraged more lenient at-
titudes toward enforcement, however, the appeals offices scattered
throughout the Executive agencies had assumed primary responsibility
for public coercive activities that supplemented and substituted for the
private coercive mechanism of the courts. In doing so, these offices ap-
pear to have implemented this coercive tool in a restrained, subtle man-
ner that often resembled that of the FOI Committee. Compulsion was a
last resort, flexibly applied, seldom explicitly invoked, and often com-
bined with simultaneous coordinative efforts. Like the FOI Committee,
the agency appeals processes had available the relatively non-threaten-
ing, impersonal sanction of a simple reversal. As the internal office re-
sponsible for giving regular advice on FOIA matters also typically
handled appeals, the appeals processes were even more integrated into
the day-to-day process of administering the Act than was the FOI Com-
mittee. Despite the narrow perspective of these intra-agency processes,
and their continued potential for misuse, they have most likely played a
more important role in inducing compliance with the Act than any
other public activity. 13 1
D. Oversight
Review of FOIA implementation throughout the Executive Branch is
yet another instance of a noncoercive public enforcement mechanism
not strictly mandated by the terms of the Act. Collection of general
data on administration of the Act, development of broad recommenda-
tions for improved processes, and answering of complaints by private
citizens about implementation characterize this aspect of public enforce-
ment. In the normal scheme of Federal administrative statutes an
agency charged with oversight often plays this role. The Privacy Act,
for example, requires the President to submit a consolidated report of
activities by all agencies under the Act for each year. 132 The Office of
Management and Budget has been assigned this task, as well as respon-
sibility for providing "continuing assistance to and oversight of the im-
plementation of the provisions" of the Privacy Act by the agencies. 133
lish, Director, FOI Service Center, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (February
29, 1984); telephone interview with Mark Lynch, Center for National Security Studies
(March 2, 1984).
131. See GAO REPORT GGD-78-51, at 45 ("The appeals office has the greatest impact on
how [Justice] Department components use legal exemptions."); telephone interview with Rus-
sell Roberts, supra note 64.
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 552A (p) (1982).
133. Privacy Act of 1974, § 6(2), Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1909, (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552A note (1982)). See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 98TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY? OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
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Under FOIA, however, Congress and its associated research organiza-
tions, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Re-
search Service (CRS), have for the most part assumed these roles
themselves without express authorization. Seldom has the Justice De-
partment supplemented their efforts, and no other agency has come
forth to do so.
During the first four years of the Act general review of agency imple-
mentation was at best sparse, and confined almost entirely to informal
activities by congressional committee staff. In 1971, after the appoint-
ment of Rep. William Moorhead (D-Calif.) as Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, and in
the face of mounting criticism by public interest representatives,1 34 the
Subcommittee formulated a plan for comprehensive oversight of imple-
mentation of the Act by more than 100 agencies. 135 The Subcommittee
staff began preparation for a series of general oversight hearings by dis-
tributing a detailed questionnaire to all agencies administering
FOIA.13 6 The oversight hearings that followed lasted fourteen days and
included testimony by some fifty witnesses with a variety of perspectives
on the administration of the Act.13 7 These hearings were only part of a
more general oversight effort that spanned 41 days of hearings, included
142 witnesses during 12 months of 1971 and 1972, and examined FOIA,
national security classifications, and congressional rights to information
from the Executive. 38 A report published on the basis of these hearings
included a series of recommendations to agencies directly responsible for
administering the Act as well as legislative recommendations that would
lead eventually to passage of the 1974 amendments. 3 9
BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND BY THE CONGRESS, H. REP. No. 455
(1983) (criticizing Office of Management and Budget for inadequate oversight efforts).
134. See, e.g., Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (1970); Katz, Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the FOIA, 48 TEx. L. REV.
1261 (1970).
135. See Congressional Research Service, Legislative Oversight and Program Evaluation, Prepared for
the Subcomm. on Oversight Procedure of the Senate Comm. on Cov'talAffairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 193
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as Legldative Oversight].
136. The questionnaire sought information on such matters as numbers of denials, ap-
peals, and court cases, as well as types of requesters and security classification arrangements.
The staff enlisted the aid of the Congressional Research Service to tabulate responses to the
questionnaire. See Special Analysis, supra note 112.
137. See Legislative Oversight, supra note 135, at 196.
138. Id
139. Recommendations to Federal departments and agencies called on them to improve
their record-keeping systems for information under the Act; to provide greater "policy direc-
tion" to field offices implementing the Act; to require that letters denying access to informa-
tion state the reasons for the refusal; to "assure maximum participation of the consultation
with public information personnel in administrative actions" under the Act; to establish fees
for processing that were uniform and "the lowest reasonable," and could be waived for hard-
ship cases or requests in the public interest; to establish seminars and other training activities
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In 1977, the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in the first general oversight hear-
ings since passage of the 1974 amendments, initiated the second compre-
hensive review of substantive and procedural aspects of FOIA
implementation. Four days of hearings with testimony from 28 wit-
nesses and additional submissions by numerous others produced a final
hearing record of over 1000 pages.14° In 1980 the Subcommittee staff,
drawing primarily on these hearings, produced a 175-page report that
made detailed recommendations to the agencies as well as to Congress
on how to improve many substantive and administrative features of
FOIA.' 4 ' The Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations
continued congressional oversight efforts with similarly extensive hear-
ings in 1980.142 Although the Subcommittee chairman relinquished his
position as a result of the change in Senate leadership in 1981, he issued
a personal report which made numerous administrative recommenda-
tions on the basis of the hearings. 4 3 Although the Reagan administra-
tion embraced few of these recommendations, 4 4  the House
Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights con-
tinued general oversight of FOIA implementation with hearings in July,
for employees affected by the Act; and to release a "positive statement" from the agency head
"affirming his personal commitment to the principles embodied in the FOI Act." 1972
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 82.
140. In these hearings the Subcommittee specifically sought to examine compliance with
the 1974 amendments and the Attorney General's 1977 policy statement, to focus in detail on
problems in agencies concerned with the law enforcement and national security exemptions
addressed in the 1974 amendments, and to develop legislative and administrative recommen-
dations to improve future compliance with the Act. See 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33,
at 1-2.
141. See id.
142. See Oversight of the Freedom of Information Act: Heanngs Before the Subcomm. on Intergovern-
mental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
143. See Senator James Sasser, Oversight of the Administration of the Federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. A Personal Report (Nov. 198 l),pnntedin Hearings on S 587, S 1235, S 1247, S 1730, and
S 1751 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiiay, Vol. 2, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SASSER REPORT]. Sasser recommended,
among other proposals, "mandating the Department of Justice [or another agency] as the
principal agency responsible for Executive Branch leadership and government-wide coordina-
tion of F.O.I. Act administration"; "creating an advisory panel, composed entirely of private
individuals, and an inter-agency council, composed of government agency representatives" to
assist in oversight activities; establishing government-wide guidelines on fees, fee waivers, at-
torneys fees, reporting and accounting systems, and use of professional and clerical employees
to search for records; requiring studies of employee training under the Act and the possibility
of establishing a hot line system to enhance public understanding of the Act; and improving
training in procedures under the Act.
144. The Administration did, however, enhance training opportunities, see infra note 212
and accompanying text, establish government-wide guidelines in certain areas, see in/ra note
189 and accompanying text, and at least maintain the Justice Department's consultative




1981.145 Hearings in the Senate under the Reagan Administration have
focused on development of legislative recommendations, both proce-
dural and substantive, to amend FOIA. 146
The 1974 amendments, in order to obviate the need for the oversight
committees themselves to distribute questionnaires, required each
agency to submit an annual report on its implementation of the Act.
Due on March 1 of each year, and delivered to the President as well as
to Congress, the reports were to include numbers of denials and deci-
sions on appeal, the reasons for all such determinations, the officials re-
sponsible for denials of requests, copies of agency regulations on FOIA
procedures, processing fees and fee waivers, and "such other information
as indicates efforts to administer fully [the FOIA provisions.]"1 4 7 The
amendments contained no provision for enforcing this reporting require-
ment, and the 1980 Senate report concluded that "while a majority of
agencies comply or make a reasonable effort to comply with the annual
reporting requirements, a number of agencies continue to file incom-
plete reports, late reports, or no reports at all. Congressional oversight
and followup on what is reported has also been spotty."'1 48
The failure of Congressional staff to make extensive use of the reports
as a basis for oversight activities resulted in large measure from the inad-
equacy of the data required in the reports. The Senate report and an
earlier GAO report agreed that, if the annual reporting requirement "is
to be used to aid decisionmaking, more accurate information and other
types of information will be needed."' 149 Among deficiencies in the re-
porting provisions, the Senate report singled out absence of a consistent
basis for reporting denials, allowance of imprecise or inaccuarate data
on costs of compliance, and the absence of any requirement to report
total requests or fee waivers granted. For 1975, 1976, and 1977, CRS
145. See Freedom of Information Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Infor-
mation and Indivdual Rights of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Hearings]. Other oversight hearings during the late
1970s and early 1980s focused specifically on implementation of the Act in law enforcement
agencies. For a general account of these and other oversight activities, see Relyea, The Rse and
Pause of the US Freedom of Information Act, 10 Gov. PUBS. REV. 19, 22-25 (1983).
146. See Freedom of Information Act. Hearings Before the Sub-comm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Vols. 1 and 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Senate Hearings]. The absence of House oversight hearings since 1981 results partly from the
reluctance of the oversight committee staff to provide encouragement to Reagan Administra-
tion officials and others who favor amendments that reduce the pro-disclosure bias of the
statutory language. Telephone interview with Robert Gellman, supra note 63.
147. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1982).
148. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 117. The Attorney General, in a 1974 mem-
orandum to all agencies, also recommended that they include data on processing costs in their
reports. See GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 106, at 43.
149. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 188. Quoting GAO REPORT 78-120, supra
note 106, at 64.
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had prepared a summary of all the reports submitted by agencies, and
had included in this survey a listing of problems revealed by the reports,
such as illegal grounds for denials and failures to report certain data.
After 1977, however, CRS analysts and Subcommittee staff agreed to
terminate the summary reports. Because preparation of these summa-
ries demanded considerable work from CRS staff, and by themselves
provided little basis for oversight activities, those involved agreed that
the analysts' time would be better spent on other types of oversight. 150
While Subcommittee staff lacked the time to tabulate all the individual
agency reports themselves, both staff members and CRS analysts contin-
ued to review the reports on a selective basis. The reporting require-
ment, however, remained largely useless.
The immensity of the task of oversight often forced the oversight sub-
committees to assign much of the burden of factfinding that underlay
the general oversight function to both the CRS and the GAO. As a
consequence of preparing various analytical reports these organizations
accumulated considerable expertise in administration of the Act. In
1978 and 1979, for example, the GAO prepared seven reports, including
lengthy in-depth studies of the administration of the Act by selected
agency field offices and by the FBI. 15' After publication of the annual
summary reports ended, CRS staff broadened their attention to other
types of analyses as part of their continued support for oversight by con-
gressional committees. 152
Finally, efforts by the Justice Department to discern and remedy sys-
tematic deficiencies in administration of FOIA have been sporadic. In
1974 the Department initiated a project to study implementation of the
Act in all agencies, but when fears about the independence of this effort
150. Telephone interview with Robert Gellman, supra note 63; telephone interview with
Harold Relyea, Congressional Research Service Specialist in American Government (April
28, 1983). See also GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 106, at 47 (report data submitted
by agencies "inconsistent" and "imprecise"). Since agencies often exaggerated figures for
processing requests and appeals, such compilations tended to reveal inflated processing costs
that might generate efforts toward lower enforcement or even legislative reform of the Act.
See Annual Reports Filed Under Information Act Show Public Interest Up, and So Are Costs, 4 ACCESS
REPORTS 9 (May 2, 1978); House Units Inquiries Sour Accuracy in Executive Agencys FOIA Report-
ing, 4 ACCESS REPORTS 9 (May 2, 1978); House Units Inquiries Sour Accuracy in Executive Agency's
FOIA Reporting, 4 ACCESS REPORTS 6 (Oct. 31, 1978).
151. See reports listed in GAO REPORT LCD-80-8, supra note 106 at 27-30; see also COMP-
TROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, UPDATE ON PREVIOUS GAO FINDINGS, OBSERVA-
TIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT No. LCD-80-103 (1980).
152. See, e.g., H. Relyea and S. Cavanaugh, Press Notices on Disclosures Made Pursuant to the
Federal Freedom of Information Act, 1972-1980. A Compilation, reprinted in 1981 House Hearing, supra
note 145, at 914; H. Relyea, The Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act: A




led to resignation of the lawyer in charge, the project collapsed. 153
Under the Carter and Reagan Administrations, the Department con-
ducted surveys of the agencies to ascertain problems in implementing
the Act. 154 These surveys, however, aimed primarily at developing legis-
lative proposals for reform. 155 In the end, studies by congressional sup-
port organizations, informal oversight by the subcommittee staffs, and
Justice Department activities, may have been a poor substitute for
strong ongoing oversight by an administrative body, especially during
the periods between comprehensive congressional reviews of FOIA
implementation.156
A final aspect of oversight encompasses answering of individual com-
plaints about agency implementation. Justice Department staff and the
staff of Congressional committees overseeing the Act have shared re-
sponsibility for this activity, which has apparently played only a small
role in ensuring compliance. The committees performed nearly all such
activities during the first decade of the Act. While no measure exists to
determine the quantity or quality of casework by oversight committee
staff, answering individual complaints about administration of the Act
appears to have been a regular task. 157 Complaints addressed by the
House Subcommittee staff on an individualized basis usually came from
the general public or the press.15 8 When complaints about a particular
agency or official accumulated, subcommittee staff would contact the
relevant agency. It remains unclear how effective such individualized
contacts were, since staff acting in this capacity could only advise the
153. See Relyea, Opening Government to Pub/ic Scutiny." A Decade of Federal Effrts, 35 PUB. AD.
REV. 3, 4 (1975).
154. Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1978 at Appendix D, 1981 at 135-36,
1982 at 205; telephone interview with Daniel Metcalf, supra note 67.
155. See Justice Department Reports cited supra note- 154; telephone interview with
Daniel Metcalf, supra note 67.
156. See, e.g., 1980 SENATE REPORT, Supra note 33, at 139 (criticizing lack of leadership by
the Justice Department in "FOIA policy and practice"); SASSER REPORT, supra note 143, at
64-68 (recommending stronger role by Justice Department in "leadership and government-
wide coordination" of FOIA administration). This result left responsibility for general im-
provements in administration with the individual agencies, whose reviews might or might not
improve processing. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION ACT OPERATIONS AT SIX JUSTICE DEPARTMENT UNITS, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT No. GGD-83-64, at 13-15 (1983) (detailing failure of Justice Department to alter
resource allocation policies after an internal 1980 review, but small improvements in process-
ing as a result of actions based on a 1982 review).
157. The House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights in
particular may have been a focus for individual complaints, because of its more specialized
oversight capacity and the inclusion of "Information" in its title. See H. Relyea, Faithfiul Exe-
cution of the FOI Act. 4 Legislative Branch Perspective, 39 PUB. AD. REV. 328, 329 (1979); tele-
phone interview with Harold Relyea, supra note 150.
158. Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Gov-
ernmental Information of the House of Representatives Government Operations Committee, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 50 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 House Hearings].
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agency, and perhaps threaten to publicize abuses.1 59
Up to 1978, the FOI Committee and its staff, preoccupied mostly with
review of agency appeals, played only a small part in supplementing
these congressional activities. For the calendar year 1977, the Justice
Department reported only about a dozen instances in which it gave "ap-
propriate guidance" to an agency or to an applicant as a result of com-
plaints submitted to the Department. 160 Establishment of the OILP
increased the Department's capacity to handle complaints: for 1979 it
reported responses to 64 inquiries, including 34 routed through Mem-
bers of Congress or congressional committees. OILP maintained records
of complaints by citizens about each agency, and would telephone or
write the agency whenever more than two or three such contacts accu-
mulated. In an unspecified number of these cases, the Department ad-
vised an agency "as to what steps the agency should take to bring itself
into compliance with [the Act]."11 6 ' While no records on the effective-
ness of such contacts were kept, they continued at a slightly lower level
into the Reagan Administration. In 1982 the Department reported han-
dling nine citizen complaints and 41 congressional inquiries. 62
E. Interpretation of the Act
One of the most prominent functions of public enforcement under the
Act was to provide guidance as to how its terms should be interpreted.
The two most important aspects of this function were to assure the most
accurate interpretation of congressional intent possible for a given situa-
tion, and to promote uniformity of interpretation in order to allay con-
fusion concerning ambiguous issues. Judicial precedents could provide
guidance as they accumulated. But the case law might require years to
establish an authoritative interpretation of a section. Moreover, those
implementing the Act, especially at the lower levels of an agency, would
159. Interview with Robert Gellman, Counsel to House Subcommittee on Gov't Informa-
tion and Individual Rights (April 8, 1983). Threats to publicize violations might operate as a
coercive sanction by holding out the prospect of embarrassment before agency officials. This
sanction too could function as a tacit as well as an explicit one, although it was unclear how
coercive it might be.
160. Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1977 at 21.
161. Justice Dep't Report, supra note 77, 1978 at 26; telephone interview with Mary Ann
Childs, former OILP staff member (April 28, 1983).
162. Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1982, at 206. Interest groups such as the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the
Freedom of Information Clearinghouse affiliated with the Nader organization might also pro-
vide a limited ombudsman service by directing citizens with complaints to the proper place or
by attempting to answer complaints themselves. Because these groups lacked the official sta-
tus of congressional or Justice Department staff, their capacity to correct abuses in adminis-
tration, through threatening suit or through some form of unfavorable publicity, was more




not have time to follow all the judicial opinions on the issues and synthe-
size them. The task fell to the public entities themselves to fill the gaps
in judicial interpretations, to combine those interpretations into a coher-
ent vision of the law, and to secure implementation of the law by the
agency officials who were the potential violators of the Act. To perform
this task, the Justice Department and the agencies resorted both to indi-
vidualized advice, like the consultations and preconsultations of the FOI
Committee, and to the general publication of interpretative guides to
the Act. In this function, as in others, the enforcement role has re-
mained subject to policy differences as to how the act should be
enforced.
The interpretative role devolved upon the Justice Department as a
matter of tradition. Shortly after passage of the original APA in 1946,
the Department prepared a detailed set of interpretations in the form of
a lengthy memorandum to advise agencies on how to administer the
Act. 16 3 Following this precedent, the Department in June, 1967, issued
a new memorandum that sought to "assist the agencies in developing a
uniform and constructive implementation" of the Act. 164 The forty-
seven page memorandum "was a policy document combining political
inputs, traditional concepts, and statutory construction."', 65 The source
of the memorandum, the thoroughness of its coverage, and the generally
high quality of its analysis made it immediately a primary resource for
substantive interpretations of the Act.166 Ironically the Justice Depart-
ment had only a year before strenuously opposed FOIA as unconstitu-
tional. 167 The compromise that enabled the bill to become law had
allowed lawyers from the Department to help prepare the House report
on the legislation.168 This report conflicted with the Senate report and
even "ambitiously [undertook] to change the meaning that appears in
163. See Attorney General's Memorandum on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947).
164. See Attorney General's Memorandum ofJune 1967 on the Public Information Section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: A Memorandum for the Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning Sec-
tion 3 of the Admi itrative Procedure Act. A Memorandum for the Executive Departments and Agencies
Concerning Section 3 of the Admistrative Procedure Act as Revised Efectivejuly 4, 1967, at iv. [here-
inafter cited as 1967 Memorandum].
165. J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND
THE LAW 3-12 (1977).
166. See 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 64 ("Next to the Act itself, and the legis-
lative history contained in committee reports and debates on the bill, the Attorney General's
Memorandum has become the single most important interpretative document upon which
executive departments and agencies rely to defend judgments on what information should be
made available to the public under the Act.").
167. See Appendix to Statement of Norbert A. Schlei, Ass't Attorney General, Depart-
ment of Justice, 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 205.
168. See Archibald, The Freedom of Information Act Revisited, 39 PUB. AD. REV. 314, 315
(1979).
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the Act's words."'1 69 Drafters of the Memorandum, relying consistently on
the language of the House Report, interpreted the Act in ways univer-
sally understood to favor broad powers not to disclose.' 70
The policymaking element in these interpretations placed them in
constant risk of being undermined by other official sources of interpreta-
tion in the courts and Congress. Courts, asserting that the Act had as-
signed interpretative authority to each of the agencies rather than to the
Justice Department, declined to accord the Memorandum the deference
usually given to contemporaneous agency construction of its own stat-
ute.' 7' On several occasions, in fact, courts rejected interpretations in
the Memorandum as not in keeping with a proper reading of the Act. For
example, under the second exemption, which protects matters "related
solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency," the
House report sought to include "[o]perating rules, guidelines, and
manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners."' 72
The Memorandum simply affirmed this interpretation. 73  It thus ne-
glected to mention the Senate report, which had assumed that manuals
and guidelines would be disclosed and had mentioned only routine em-
ployer-employee rules as exempt under the provision. 174 Most cases
under this exemption have adopted the Senate interpretation rather
than the version espoused by the Memorandum.175
The original FOIA also exempted "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confi-
169. Davis, The Infomaton Act. A Prehmhiary Anayst), 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 761, 763 (1967).
170. See 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 64-65 ("the memorandum . . . in its
overall tone and in detailed discussions of the exemptions of subsection (b) of the act leans
toward a restrictive interpretation of these key provisions."); O'REILLY, supra note 165, at 3-
12 ("The client desired the protection of vague textual terms and broadly interpreted powers
of nondisclosure, and the client got what it wanted."); Davis, supra, note 169, at 761 (the
Memorandum "quite legitimately .. reflects the point of view of the agencies, all of whom
opposed the act.").
171. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969),appeal dismissed 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
172. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1966).
173. 1967 Memorandum, supra note 164, at 30-31 ("As the examples cited in the House
report indicate, the exemption in subsection (e)(2) is designed to permit the withholding of
agency records relating to management operations to the extent that the proper performance
of necessary agency functions requires such withholding.").
174. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965) ("Examples of [internal personnel
rules and practices] may be rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of
lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.") [hereinafter cited as 1965
SENATE REPORT].
175. In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration the court
based its choice of the interpretation in the Senate report on the ground that that report was
the only one considered by both Houses of Congress. In Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp.
1371, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1972), afd sub nom. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir.
1973), another court adopted the approach of the Senate report as more consistent with the
plain meaning of the statute.
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dential."'' 76 The Memorandum interpreted the phrase "obtained from a
person" to extend the exemption to material originating either outside
or inside the executive bureaucracy.1 77 The original bill had only pro-
tected information obtained "from the public,"178 and at least two agen-
cies had urged in 1965 hearings that the exemption be expanded to
encompass information originating within the agencies.' 79 The Senate
Report on the legislation, however, explained the substitution of "per-
son" for "public" as an attempt to constrict the breadth of the exemp-
tion: "It was pointed out in statements to the Committee that agencies
may obtain information of a highly personal and individual nature. To
better convey this idea the substitute language is provided."'18 0 Subse-
quently, courts generally interpreted the exemption to "condone
witholding information only when it is obtained from a person outside
an agency."''81
A second Memorandum offered detailed advice to agencies on how to
interpret the 1974 amendments to the Act.18 2 While reaction to this
document was more positive than to the first memorandum, 1 3 the 1980
Senate Report found reason to criticize the 1975 Memorandum for mis-
construction of the amendments "at various points."'' 84 Still, in part be-
176. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982).
177. /967 Memorandum, supra note 164, at 34.
178. Katz, supra note 134, at 1271.
179. See 1965 Senate Hearigs, supra note 23, at 383 (comments on S. 1336 by Dep't of
Agriculture); at 437 (comments on S. 1336 by Dep't of Labor).
180. 1965 SENATE REPORT, supra note 174, at 2.
181. Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash.
1968), aftd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Grumman Aircraft Eng'ring Corp. v. Rene-
gotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
182. Dep't ofJustice, Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of
Informatton Act (1975) [hereinafter cited as /975 Memorandum].
183. See 1 K. Davis, Admintstratzve Law Treatise § 5:1, at 310 (2d Ed. 1978) (describing /975
Memorandum as "gaining general judicial acceptance" in contrast to /967 Memorandum).
184. 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 151. While the text of the amendments
allowed in camera inspection by a court of "any" records in dispute, the 1975 Memorandum
discussed in camera review only with respect to the national security exemption. The Senate
report took this reading to be an improper limitation on when in camera review should take
place. Id at 44-45. A "Preliminary Guidance" memorandum printed along with the 1975
Memorandum encouraged agencies to toll the processing deadlines in the amendments in
cases that entailed substantial cost, and in which the agencies sought the consent of the re-
quester to those costs before processing. 1975 Memorandum, supra note 182, at 9-10. The Sen-
ate report found no foundation for this policy in the amendments, and contradictory
language in a prominent early judicial decision on the Act: "To deny a citizen that access to
agency records which Congress has specifically granted, because it would be difficult to find
the records, would subvert Congressional intent to say the least." Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F.
Supp. 175, 177 (D. Md. 1970), aJ'd 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). The Preliminary Guidance
memorandum further suggested that a ten-day statutory extension for unusual circumstances
in processing of requests could be allocated partly to the initial processing period and partly
to the appellate processing period. /975 Memorandum,supra note 182, at 4. The Senate report
cited a previous Senate report prepared to accompany the amendment at their passage to
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cause the amendments themselves were largely procedural,
disagreement between the Memorandum and the Senate report over inter-
pretations of the 1974 amendments was less substantial than the contro-
versy raised by the 1967 Memorandum. The two memoranda remain in
use today as aids to interpretation of certain provisions of FOIA. They
have become the starting point as well for an entire series of similar
government-wide interpretative documents by Justice Department
lawyers. 185
Interpretative guidance of this sort increased following the establish-
ment of OILP in 1978. In 1979, the Department issued three memo-
randa giving policy guidance: one to aid in the interpretation of the
fifth exemption, and two to help agencies to interpret the Supreme
Court's decision concerning so-called "reverse FOIA" suits in Chysler v.
Brown .186 FOIA Update, a quarterly publication begun by OILP in Au-
tumn, 1979, and distributed in a circulation of approximately 4000
throughout the Federal government, immediately became a vehicle for
regular guidance as to how the Act was to be interpreted and adminis-
tered.'8 7 A substantial part of this newsletter consisted of interpretative
materials prepared by Justice lawyers. OILP also began to publish an
annual Freedom of Information Case List, enumerating all the court cases
under the Act and cross-referencing them by subject matter. Later edi-
tions of the Case List included a tabulation of books and articles con-
cerning the Act, and a "Short Guide to the Freedom of Information
Act" that briefly explained the most important case law for each signifi-
cant part of the Act.' 8 While the reorganization under the Reagan Ad-
ministration eliminated the OILP, the Justice Department continued to
publish both the Case List and FOIA Update. In addition, government-
wide memoranda became the vehicle for several attempts by the Attor-
demonstrate a legislative intent to invoke the extension "either during initial review of the
request or during appellate review." 1980 Senate Report, supra note 33, at 152.
185. In addition to the 1977 "demonstrable harm" memorandum, which functioned more
as a policy statement for agencies to follow of their own accord than as a coercive control, the
Justice Department issued three other specific directives in 1977. These documents sought to
discourage use of the seventh exemption as a basis for withholding information on illegal
government activities, records from an applicant's file affecting a third party but also the
applicant, and documents with administrative markings. 1980 Senate Report, supra note 33, at
44-45.
186. 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (allowing jurisdiction only under APA Sec. 701 to protect pri-
vate information submitted to the government from FOIA disclosure). See Policy Guidance-
When to Assert the Deliberative Privilege under FOIA Exemption Five (June 6, 1979); Memorandum
from Robert Saloschin to All Federal Departments and Agencies (June 15, 1979); Memoran-
dum from Assistant Attorney General Barbara Babcock to General Counsels of All Federal
Departments and Agencies (June, 1979).
187. For figures on circulation, see Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1981 at
137.
188. Department of Justice, Freedom ofInformation Case List (Sept. 1982 ed.).
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ney General to enumerate new policies in interpretation of the Act.18 9
The extent of compliance with such interpretative statements was un-
clear, and may well have varied widely. The 1972 House report found
that the regulations of "some agencies" failed to adhere to the 1967
Memorandum ,19o and the 1980 Senate report criticized compliance with
the three 1977 directives as "less than partial."19' In at least one in-
stance, disagreements as to the policies to be followed in administering
FOIA under the Reagan Administration might have undermined the
authority of Justice Department interpretations just as earlier judicial
interpretations had undermined parts of the 1967 Memorandum. A policy
statement by the Department on waiver of fees for search and copying
of documents provoked the House Subcommittee responsible for over-
sight to send letters to all departments and agencies urging that they
disregard the Justice Department's advice. 9 2 While no systematic data
on implementation of the fee waiver provision exists, anecdotal evidence
suggests that many agencies ignored the oversight subcommittee's inter-
pretation and followed the Justice Department guidelines.193 Despite
the leeway the Act allowed for policy differences, and despite the essen-
tially coordinative, noncoercive character of interpretative efforts by the
Justice Department, this tool served as a helpful guide for agency offi-
cials in search of guidance as to substantive interpretation of the Act.
Offices responsible for FOIA administration and appeals within agen-
cies might occasionally set forth policies for a single agency in the same
way that the Justice Department offered broader interpretative gui-
dance for agencies generally. 94 Moreover, the statutory authority agen-
cies possessed to regulate their own procedures for enforcement made
the guidelines they issued more likely to be heeded by lower level offi-
cials than general Justice Department interpretations, which might only
be enforced through the sanction of withholding counsel. The Justice
Department itself, with one of the highest concentrations of FOIA appli-
cations, assumed a leading role in this area. As early as 1976, the De-
189. See Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1981, at 136, (six policy statements
issued in 1981, including removal of "demonstrable harm" standard for denials).
190. See 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 9.
191. 1981 SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 45.
192. See Memorandum from Asst. Attorney General Jonathan Rose to Heads of All Fed-
eral Departments and Agencies (Jan. 7, 1983); Letter from Rep. Glenn English to All Agency
Heads (Feb. 22, 1983).
193. See sources listed supra note 130.
194. Telephone interview with Russell Roberts, surpa note 68; interview with Robert
Gellman, supra note 159. This leverage varied greatly according to the position of FOI of-
ficers within an agency's organizational structure. When a Secretary or Deputy Secretary
made the initial decision to withhold information, the FOI officials might be left out of deci-
sionmaking under the Act altogether. Telephone interview with Russell Roberts, surpa note
64; telephone interview with Mark Lynch, supra note 134.
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partment distributed internal guidelines that set out a standard for
appeals weighted heavily in favor of disclosure. In 1979, the Depart-
ment also distributed guidance to its component units concerning appli-
cation of the fee waiver provisions of the 1974 amendments. Since the
Department favored highly discretionary application of the fee waiver
provisions, it chose to distribute copies of letters explaining previous de-
cisions on fee waivers in lieu of a single interpretative memorandum.195
More individualized interpretative guidance, in the form of consulta-
tions, became increasingly the province of separate agency offices over
the course of the 1970's. 196 To encourage development of expertise
within the agencies, and to conserve its own resources, the OILP tended
to discourage consultations on individual applications that did not raise
significant policy issues. 197 OILP also published a list of legal and ad-
ministrative contracts on information issues for each of the agencies.19
Summary telephone consultations by Justice Department officials, how-
ever, continued unabated into the Reagan Administration at a rate of
950 or more per year. 199
The policies of individual agencies toward internal individualized
contacts appear to have varied considerably. Some, such as the Justice
Department, relied heavily on advice from a central information office
both before and after initial decisions on denials were made.2° ° Other
agencies sought to systematize consultations, or avoid the need for them
entirely, by requiring clearance of any denial with one of the agency's
attorneys, or with one of a handful of authorized agency officials. 20' Al-
though information on the prevalence of such techniques remains
largely unavailable, they doubtless play a significant role in assuring
compliance in day-to-day administration of the Act.
195. Memorandum from Quinlan J. Shea, Office of Privacy and Information Appeals, to
All Department of Justice Coordinators (March 14, 1979) (with attachments). The central
information policy office in the Commerce Department has played a similar guiding role. See
2 FOIA Update 7 (June 1981).
196. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
197. See I FOIA Update 7 (Autumn 1979) ("except in matters of usual difficulty or im-
portance agencies should wait to consult until they have tentatively determined to deny an
administrative appeal"; and consultations by telephone on such appeals should be reserved
for "uncertain, important, or novel questions").
198. Memorandum from Robert Saloschin to All Federal Departments and Agencies
(June 1, 1979) (listing "principal legal and administrative contracts for Freedom of Informa-
tion Act questions.').
199. Justice Dep't Annual Reports, supra note 77, 1981 at 134 (for 1980), 1982 at 203 (for
1982).
200. See Dep't of Justice Management Div., Evaluation of the Dep't ofJustke Management of
the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act 10-16 (Oct. 1980) (outlining institutional structure for
processing FOIA applications to Justice Department under Carter Administration).





Along with distribution of interpretative materials and individualized
consultations, enforcement activity by governmental entities in the late
1970's and early 1980's focused on training the employees assigned to
administer the Act. These efforts aimed both at inculcating knowledge
of the Act and at instilling proper attitudes toward compliance without
the need for externally imposed sanctions.
In part, training was a natural process that took place through the
increasing familiarization of agency employees with the procedures of
the Act and the slow accumulation of expertise among those who
worked most with information issues. In addition, workers entering gov-
ernment service after FOIA's enactment were unfamiliar with the mores
of bureaucratic secrecy that preceded the Act, and much more receptive
to policies that favored disclosure.202
The emergence of "Freedom of Information officers" as a distinct
class of employees charged with primary responsibility for administra-
tion of the Act enhanced the general trend toward greater awareness
and acceptance of the underlying principles of the Act.20 3 This group,
along with others reponsible for administering such related laws as the
Privacy Act, 20 4 the Sunshine in Government Act, 20 5 and the Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act,20 6 formed its own professional organization, the
American Society of Access Professionals (ASAP), in the fall of 1980.207
At regular meeting ASAP members, who numbered 250 by 1981 and
300 by 1983, discuss issues related to information law. The group also
sponsors workshops on FOIA and related laws, and conducts surveys to
ascertain the needs of Federal employees administering those laws, and
gives awards as part of an incentive program for information officers.208
A representative of ASAP testified in congressional oversight hearings
on FOIA in 1981, urging "that the Congress encourage agencies to
202. Telephone interview with Russell Roberts, supra note 64; telephone interview with
Robert Gellman, supra note 63; telephone interview with Harold Relyea, supra note 150.
When the Carter Administration entered in 1977, the Department of Justice took advantage
of such a change by distributing a briefing booklet on "What Every Federal Official Should
Know About the Freedom of Information Act." See Justice Dept. Annual Report, supra note
77, (1977) at 18.
203. Telephone interview with Russell Roberts, supra note 64; telephone interview with
Robert Gellman, supra note 63; telephone interview with Robert Saloschin, supra note 74.
204. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896-1910 (1974), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
205. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982).
206. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770, codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-14
(1982).
207. See 2 FOIA Update 7 (Fall 1980).
208. See 2 FOIA Update 8 (June 1981); telephone interview with Russell Roberts, supra
note 64. The Federal Bar Association, a private organization, conducted similar seminars
attended by agency personnel.
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devote sufficient staff, equipment and resources to administer the Act as
effectively and efficiently as possible"; that agencies "make far greater
efforts in conjunction with the professionalization and training of their
staffs responsible for administering the Act"; and that Congress conduct
"an assessment and evaluation of the processing procedures, records
management practices and organizational structures of problem agen-
cies, and . . . identify the major elements of proven and successful oper-
ations under the Act at other agencies and departments. '20 9 The
interest of ASAP members in maintaining relations with their supervi-
sors may have precluded the fledgling professional organization from
taking a more aggressive stance on its own behalf.2 10 But the activities
of ASAP, by materially assisting those administering the Act, by speak-
ing on their behalf, and by enhancing their sense of identity, reflect and
reinforce the new bureaucratic interest that has arisen to foster training,
proper procedures, and the overall policy of disclosure itself.
Several agencies also undertook government-wide training activities.
The Civil Service Commission held 70 training sessions on the Act with
a total of 4,659 participants in 1976, and 49 sessions with a total of 1,751
participants in 1977.211 After 1979, FOIA Update listed pending semi-
nars and training sessions each quarter under sponsorship of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Office of Personnel Management, the Agriculture
Department Graduate School, or the National Archives and Records
Service of the General Services Administration. The Justice Depart-
ment played a key role in many of these sessions, even when sponsored
by other agencies. Officials from the FOI Committee or the OILP re-
ported 17 appearances at seminars, conferences, or briefings on the Act
in 1977, 16 in 1979, and 35 in 1981.212 In 1981 the Department also
instituted a regular course entitled "Introduction to Information Law
for Attorneys" as part of its Legal Education Institute.
Training sessions on FOIA also became a regular feature of efforts to
promote compliance in most agencies. 21 3 Chief officials charged with
209. Freedom of Information Oversight. Hearings Before the Government Information and Individual
Rights Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 780-88 (1981) (statement of Bruce Moyer for ASAP). See also Comments of the
American Association of Access Professionals on Proposed Legislation, 1981 Senate Heanngs,
supra note 146, vol. 2, at 279.
210. Telephone interview with Harold Relyea, supra note 150; telephone interview with
Robert Gellman, supra note 63.
211. See GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 148, at 13. The total might be expected
to decline as the number of employees working with the Act who had already attended the
sessions increased.
212. See Justice Dep't Annual Reports, supra note 77, at 1977 at 19, 1979 at 111, 1981 at
137.
213. See GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 148, at 13. But see SASSER REPORT, supra
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administration of the Act at the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare conducted roving seminars at the Departments's national and
regional offices, and attributed a relatively low rate of information deni-
als partly to their emphasis on training.2 14 Often, however, training at
agency field offices took the form of a formal, standard presentation.2 15
In 1978, the General Accounting Office, noting the wide variety of
training experiences for employees in agency field offices, found that
some of the training, including certain Civil Service seminars, remained
too general to help employees solve specific enforcement problems.2 1 6
Enhanced training, the GAO found, could also help avoid confusion
about conflicts between the requirements of FOIA and other informa-
tion statutes such as the Privacy Act.
III. Public Facilitation of Private Enforcement Under FOIA
As indicated earlier, the few comprehensive and reliable statistics on
information requests under the Act suggest that public awareness and
exercise of rights to information increased in the late 1970's. The
number of requests and intra-agency appeals climbed, and the number
of cases listed in the Justice Department's backlog mounted to well over
1,000 during this period. At the same time, despite increasing resolution
of legal issues under the Act, the number of new cases the Department
received each month remained steady.2 1 7
Part of the growth in use of the Act has doubtless resulted from the
substantive and procedural changes made by the 1974 amendments, as
well as administrative efforts to facilitate compliance described in the
previous section of this Note. Certainly, the appeals mechanisms could
be seen as devices designed to provide some recourse in the event of a
denial short of a costly judicial trial. Similarly, the exercise or
threatened exercise of the Justice Department's authority to refuse coun-
sel could help to assure that the opportunity to appeal was itself more
meaningful. General review of procedures under the Act could help to
isolate and resolve particular enforcement problems. Handling of indi-
vidual complaints by the Justice Department or congressional staff
could provide highly efficient aid in obtaining information for appli-
cants faced with intransigent agency officials who refused to disclose ma-
note 143, at 85-86 (depicting deficiencies in training at agency level under Carter
Administration).
214. See 1 FOIA Update I (Autumn 1980).
215. See GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 148, at id.
216. Id at 13-17.
217. See GAO REPORT LCD-80-8, supra note 106, at 13. Comprehensive figures for the
1980s have yet to be compiled.
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terial, and smooth out smaller problems in implementation for the
benefit of future applicants. Interpretative activities could help ensure
that agencies processed applications in ways that conformed with the
substantive and procedural requirements of FOIA, and, to the degree
interpretations were available to the general public, could help appli-
cants to know how to apply for information and when agencies were
violating their statutory rights. Increased training could further en-
hance efficiency and compliance with the law in the processing of appli-
cations and appeals.
Increased use of FOIA and its remedies also doubtless resulted from
the gradual familiarization with its provisions by those private groups
with an interest in obtaining government information. The business
community has found the Act a valuable tool for gaining access to infor-
mation that competitors submit to the government. 21 8 A cottage indus-
try of "FOI Service" companies now submits requests for information
on behalf of firms that wish to maintain confidentiality about their ap-
plications. These intermediaries submitted over 40 percent of the 32,000
requests received by the Food and Drug Administration in 1979.219 For
lawyers, FOIA has sometimes proven a more effective alternative to
traditional judicial discovery proceedings.22 0 Businesses, service compa-
nies, and law firms together submitted 86 percent of all requests to the
Food and Drug Administration under the Act in 1979,221 and perhaps
three-fifths of applications to all agencies.2 22 Scholars, public interest
groups, and the press also utilize the Act and its remedies to obtain in-
formation in furtherance of professional or other interests. 223
218. See Montgomery, Peters, and Weinberg, The Freedom oflnformation Act." Strategir Oppor-
tunities and Threats, 19 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 1 (Winter 1978).
219. See 1981 Senate Heanngs,supra note 146, vol. 1, at 235 (1981) (Statement of Prof. John
Marthinsen). See generally L. Smith, Washington's New Sleuths, DUN'S REVIEw 70 (Oct. 1976),
reprinted in 1981 Senate Hearngs, supra note 146, vol. 2, at 836.
220. See, e.g., Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Action.- The Freedom of Information Act and
the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 843 (1981); Fleming, The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act." An Important Discovery Aid in Labor Law Cases, 16 LAw NOTES 53 (Spring 1980).
221. Elengold, Freedom of Information Policy at the FDA, 35 FOOD, DRUG, CosM. L.J. 627
(1980).
222. Weinstein, Open Season on Open Government, N.Y. Times Magazine, June 10, 1979, at
74,printed in 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 146, vol. 2, at 840. For example, 55 percent of all
requests to the Defense Department between 1975 and 1980 were from such groups. 1981
Senate Hearings, supra note 146, vol. 1, at 106 (Statement of William Taft, General Counsel,
Department of Defense).
223. Individual scholars used FOIA requests to further their research. Public interest
groups made requests as part of their continual scrutiny of the political process. The Freedom
of Information Clearinghouse associated with the Nader organization, the Center for Na-
tional Security Studies affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union, and similar organi-
zations helped to facilitate such uses of the Act. These organizations sought to provide
assistance to individual citizens seeking to use the Act. Finally, use of the Act by the press,
while probably lower than anticipated, produced a continual flow of news stories based on
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Explanatory publications and mass publicity about the Act may have
directly facilitated or promoted the exercise of rights under it. Most of
the primary sources on the Act are publications the government has is-
sued as a matter of standard procedure, such as congressional hearings,
or those issued to facilitate implementation directly by the agencies,
such as the Attorney General's memoranda and FOIA Update.224 But at
least two government publications are designed primarily to enable pri-
vate citizens to use the Act without legal assistance. 225 A multitude of
private publications have also promoted understanding of the Act by
tracking the latest legal developments and systematizing the interpreta-
tive data contained in many of the government documents. 226 Several
private publications have also adopted an explanatory approach ori-
ented toward the concerns of average citizens who might want to use the
Act.
2 2 7
released information. See CAMPAIGN FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 3 (detailing numer-
ous uses of the Act by the press, public interest groups, and scholars).
224. FOIA Update, for example, had a circulation of 4000 among Federal offices, but only
179 outside the Federal government. See Justice Dep't Annual Report, supra note 77, 1981 at
137. Annual subscription price from the Government Printing Office was $5.50 domestically
or $6.90 for foreign subscribers. The Freedom ofInformation Case List, with its systematization of
cases under the Act and list of references, served a similar dual purpose. Distributed free to
the agencies, and relied upon by Justice Department lawyers, it was also available for
purchase from the Government Printing Office (GPO). Justice Department officials also dis-
tributed printed copies of the 1967 and 1975 Attorney General's memoranda and other policy
statements on request. Congressional references on the Act, such as the 1972 House subcom-
mittee report, the 1980 Senate subcommittee report, transcripts of hearings, and sourcebooks
of legislative records, articles, and cases, were available for purchase from the GPO, or free
from the issuing Committees while supplies lasted, and can be consulted in many libraries.
See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., IST SESS., FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, S. Doc.
No. 82, (1975); JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 30.
225. The Justice Department, in cooperation with the General Services Administration,
published a free 18-page pamphlet of basic questions and answers on the FOIA and the Pri-
vacy Act in 1981. The booklet, entitled "Your Right to Federal Records," quickly became
one of the ten most popular free publications released by the Federal Consumer Information
Center, with nearly 14,000 copies distributed in a month. See 2 FOIA Update 8 (June 1981).
several years before the House Government Operations Committee prepared a more detailed
booklet with the same aim, which is currently available for $4.50 from the Government Print-
ing Office. STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERA-
TIONS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., A CITIZENS GUIDE ON How TO USE THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT IN REQUESTING GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS,
H.R. REP. No. 793 (1977).
226. Access Reports, a biweekly newsletter of 10-12 pages that covers the various informa-
tion laws, is one of several newsletters published by the Washington Monitor. Privaey Tnes, a
similar biweekly, treats issues under FOIA as well as the Privacy Act. And a two-volume
treatise by James O'Reilly, entitled Federal Information Disclosure, has been supplemented twice
yearly since it first appeared in 1977. Such publications provide a detailed, up-to date picture
of the Act and its administration that systematizes and builds on the raw materials of govern-
ment documents. Supplementing them as well are the dozens of law review articles that
appear each year on the Act. For a comprehensive listing see Freedom of Information Case List
129-50 (1982 ed.).
227. See, e.g., CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, LITIGATION UNDER THE FED-
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Press coverage of events surrounding implementation of the Act may
have further promoted its use. News of Congressional hearings and such
significant actions as the publication of the Attorney General's memo-
randa, for example, may have helped to alert the public of the opportu-
nity to take advantage of the Act and its remedies.22 8 Frequent mention
of the Act in news stories concerned with information released as a result
of private requests, appeals, or suits may have spurred further private
resort to the Act. With little systematic empirical evidence on requests
or litigation under the Act, it remains difficult to generalize further
about the motivation behind private resort to its remedies. Clearly,
however, a mixture of public and private efforts characterizes those ac-
tivities aimed at directly stimulating private enforcement.
IV. Lessons from FOJA Enforcement
This Note has traced the evolution of public enforcement in the con-
text of a statute imposing requirements on the Federal government it-
self.2 29 The implications of this survey for the process of enforcement,
however, extend far beyond this type of statutory framework to any stat-
ute imposed in the context of a bureaucracy, and perhaps to the nature
of enforcement in general. Most striking of the lessons to be gleaned
from the story of FOIA is the range of tools available to public enforce-
ment officials beyond the imposition of coercive sanctions. Those en-
forcing the Act offered individualized advice to potential violators;
answered complaints from private citizens about questionable practices
under the Act; conducted general investigations to ascertain broader
problems in the enforcement apparatus; formulated official interpreta-
tions to help guide activities under the Act; trained employees in order
to instill greater awareness and greater willingness to comply; and issued
publications and generated press coverage of the Act to encourage pri-
vate citizens to vindicate their rights under the statute. Isolating the
ERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (7th ed. 1982) (yearly editions); R. GORDON, THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT (1977); R. BOUCHARD AND J.
FRANKLIN, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT
(1980).
228. "A congressional hearing, in addition to gathering in written form the masses of
detailed fact needed to write a report or develop a proposal, moves on a more dramatic or
educational oral level which should illustrate the issues in a way that is both comprehensible
and interesting to the general public. And the hearings can communicate their message to
the public only by capturing the attention of the media." Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:
Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 547, 607 (1979).
229. This kind of statute, which Mashaw has termed a "structural" statute, see Mashaw,
supra note 7, at 38, typically regulates the processes and institutions by which the government
operates rather any substantive area. Examples of this type of statute, which often rely heav-
ily on a private right of action, include the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), and the
Sunshine in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982).
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effectiveness of each of these activities would be as difficult as separating
the effects of all of them from those of sanctions. No adequate measure
exists to determine the degree of compliance any one or all of these tools
induced. But the multiplicity of these noncoercive enforcement activi-
ties indicates that they did play some role in attaining whatever level of
compliance was achieved. Moreover, the proliferation of this type of
enforcement activity, and the tendency of even publicly applied sanc-
tions to be relatively non-coercive and non-threatening, point to the im-
portant role that inducing voluntary compliance may play in
enforcement.
Clearly these non-coercive techniques merit general consideration as
tools for bringing about compliance. The range and characteristics of
public enforcement activities under FOIA are most relevant to enforce-
ment of statutes against government officials. But their implications for
implementation of law in any complex bureaucracy, whether a public
agency or a private organization such as a corporation or a union, can
hardly be underestimated. In large measure, enforcement will be a mat-
ter of instilling proper attitudes toward the law within the organization,
whether through training or through the threat of sanctions. The story
of FOIA, however, suggests that other aspects of enforcement are funda-
mental as well. The interpretative function of synthesizing statutory
language, legislative history and judicial rulings into a guide to behavior
at the most mundane levels of bureaucratic activity appears to be an
inescapable element of enforcing the law. Training of affected employ-
ees at least lays the groundwork for this aspect of enforcement. Ulti-
mately, written materials and individual consultants provide important
elements that aid an organization in its attempts to comply with the
law.
A second concern, often intimately related to the first, is the coordina-
tive function. The more complex and extensive the bureaucratic action
necessary to effectuate statutory language, the more some organizational
framework to facilitate enforcement, such as that provided by the indi-
vidual agency FOI Offices, the Justice Department, and congressional
committees in FOIA enforcement, may be necessary. This coordinative
function entails both a systematic consultative role and continued re-
view of bureaucratic activities so as to discern ways that agency admin-
istration may be inefficient or may deviate from what the law prescribes.
It is difficult to imagine effective compliance with FOIA by an agency,
or effective compliance with a complex environmental statute by a man-
ufacturing company, without some such institutional mechanism for
coordination.
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Third, at least in the context of a law to be enforced through a private
right of action, informing private parties and encouraging them to resort
to the private remedy appears to be an important part of public as well
as private enforcement, and may profoundly affect the attitudes of po-
tential violators. Without this information the threat of a sanction may
remain largely unrealized.
In part, of course, sanctioning and the other public enforcement activ-
ities, as well as the private enforcement activities that have evolved, rep-
resent a response to the original judicial sanction. The increasing
familiarization by private groups to use of the Act, and the proliferation
of publications and publicity regarding the Act, may foreshadow the
gradual institutionalization of the private sanctioning mechanism origi-
nally designed to serve as a substitute for a public enforcement agency.
Intra-agency appeals, the FOI Committee, the general oversight and in-
terpretative activities by the Department of Justice, and training in
FOIA administration all evolved partly from the desire of Executive of-
ficials to avoid the financial, professional, and political costs of litiga-
tion. It remains difficult, however, to regard such a proliferation of
activities as generated solely by fear of litigation. These public enforce-
ment efforts also express a commitment on the part of agencies or Jus-
tice Department officials to promote compliance. The general oversight
activities undertaken by Congress to better effectuate the intent of the
statute, and the emergence of ASAP as an internal bureaucratic force
favoring responsible administration of the Act, demonstrate that public
enforcement maintains vitality independent of the threat of private suit.
The history of the Act shows how the combination of this commit-
ment to ensuring compliance with an effective judicial sanctions may
ultimately lead to the internalization of legal norms and the mecha-
nisms for effectuating them within an agency. Over the first fifteen
years of the Act's existence the burden of coercive sanctioning, as well as
of the various noncoercive forms of enforcement, shifted gradually to-
ward the agency officials who made the initial decisions under the Act.
By the late 1960s, the Justice Department, acting in its own perceived
interest as well as in the interest of compliance, had begun to take over
part of the judicial function of applying coercion to potential violators,
and to supplement the judicial function of interpretation. By the late
1970's, as Justice Department activities focused increasingly on broader
interpretative activities and government-wide training activities, the in-
dividual agency FOIA offices, with the encouragement of the Justice
Department, assumed an increasing proportion of responsibility for
sanctioning, consultation, and training of their own employees. All
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these activities, along with those of the information professionals, proba-
bly contributed to increasing awareness of the requirements of the Act
throughout the agencies. These activities appear to have coincided with
the entry of a new generation of government workers unfamiliar with
bureaucratic mores that preceded the Act to produce a greater bureau-
cratic willingness to comply. 230 By the late 1970's implementation in
many agencies, directed if not performed by internal FOIA Offices, had
developed into a bureaucratic routine which reflected not only conven-
ience, habit and an ideological commitment to compliance, but also an
equilibrium or "truce" among the competing interests of information
professionals, other bureaucrats, Justice Department officials, and con-
gressional overseers. 231 In this way, FOIA became largely self-enforcing
in many agencies.2 32
This process of internalization may typify the way a bureaucracy,
whether public or private, adapts to a new set of regulatory require-
ments. Since officials in a private bureaucracy are not employees of the
government itself, they may feel less obligation to promote compliance
with a law within their organization than would public officials. But
just as internal FOIA Offices assumed responsibility for appeals, consul-
tations, and training within an agency, a company faced with the need
to comply with occupational health and safety regulations will often es-
tablish an internal office to regulate activities designed to comply with
the law, to provide information on how to comply, to train employees,
and even to act as an advocate of the policies underlying the law.233
This process of internalization, of course, depends in part on positive
attitudes toward compliance within a public or a private bureaucracy.
While no guage of government-wide attitudes toward the Act over time
exists, the shifting policies toward disclosure manifest in Justice Depart-
ment activities illustrate how internal public or private enforcement re-
mains contingent on internal policies toward the substance of the law
being enforced. Even in the Department of Justice, however, the inter-
nalization of the norms embodied in the Act, especially by officials
230. See GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 148, at 6-8; GAO REPORT GGD-78-51,
supra note 88, at 47-48; Relyea, The Freedom of Information Act a Decade Later, 39 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 310, 310 (1979).
231. For a general account of these ways to describe organizational activity, see R. NEL-
SON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 96-136 (1982).
232. See GAO REPORT LCD-78-120, supra note 148, at 10; GAO REPORT GGD-78-51,
supra note 88, at 66-67. Another long-term effect of FOIA has been to induce initial disclo-
sure of more materials by agencies so that the public need not file a request under the Act for
information. Interview with Robert Gellman, supra note 159; telephone interview with Har-
old Relyea, supra note 150.
233. Set E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULA-
TORY UNREASONABLENESS 217-42 (1983).
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whose careers have spanned more than one Administration, has ensured
a degree of continuity between Administrations in such tasks as consul-
tation, training, oversight, and, to a lesser extent, the exercise of author-
ity to refuse to defend suits.
A final set of conclusions follows from an appraisal of the sanctioning
mechanisms used by public officials enforcing the Act. With the excep-
tion of the statutory disciplinary sanction, these public sanctions shared
several characteristics. The penalties applied as sanctions, usually
amounting to little more than the embarassment of reversal in any indi-
vidual case, were mild and largely impersonal. The offices with author-
ity to apply these penalties possessed the flexibility to substitute mere
advice for sanctions, and to negotiate with affected parties in order to
obviate the need to apply the sanction in a given instance. Moreover,
sanctioning could take place as an integrated part of an ongoing, largely
consultative relationship between the enforcement office and the bu-
reaucrats who were potential violators. The apparent atrophy of the
disciplinary sanction as an enforcement tool may trace largely to the
absence of such characteristics. Sanctions under this provision, regard-
less of their specific form, were understood as a type of personal censure;
the process of applying such sanctions entailed the relatively elaborate
mechanism of a formal investigation and findings, and for a time of an
initial judicial finding; and the absence of an ongoing relationship be-
tween the civil service authority and agencies, at least in the area of
information processing, made sanctioning a potentially threatening bu-
reaucratic intrusion.
Some combination of mildness, flexible application, and integration
into the normal functioning of agencies thus appears important to the
effective enforcement of law. The introduction of non-coercive forms of
sanctions into normal bureaucratic procedures make the process of in-
ducing compliance less threatening to potential violators. As a result,
these officials may be more willing to compromise with enforcers and
ultimately to comply with the law. Flexibility and integration also offer
the advantage of increasing the administrative efficiency of enforcement
efforts. These features of internal sanctions may produce a greater will-
ingness to apply such sanctions, and consequently a greater degree of
deterrence. Finally, more efficient enforcement can save administrative
resources for other more substantive bureaucratic tasks.
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